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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for 
protecting and improving the environment as a valuable asset 
for the people of Ireland. We are committed to protecting people 
and the environment from the harmful effects of radiation and 
pollution.
The work of the EPA can be 
divided into three main areas:
Regulation: We implement effective regulation and environmental 
compliance systems to deliver good environmental outcomes and 
target those who don’t comply.
Knowledge: We provide high quality, targeted and timely 
environmental data, information and assessment to inform 
decision making at all levels.
Advocacy: We work with others to advocate for a clean, 
productive and well protected environment and for sustainable 
environmental behaviour.
Our Responsibilities
Licensing
We regulate the following activities so that they do not endanger 
human health or harm the environment:
•  waste facilities (e.g. landfills, incinerators, waste transfer 
stations);
•  large scale industrial activities (e.g. pharmaceutical, cement 
manufacturing, power plants);
•  intensive agriculture (e.g. pigs, poultry);
•  the contained use and controlled release of Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMOs);
•  sources of ionising radiation (e.g. x-ray and radiotherapy 
equipment, industrial sources);
•  large petrol storage facilities;
•  waste water discharges;
•  dumping at sea activities.
National Environmental Enforcement
•  Conducting an annual programme of audits and inspections of 
EPA licensed facilities.
•  Overseeing local authorities’ environmental protection 
responsibilities.
•  Supervising the supply of drinking water by public water 
suppliers.
•  Working with local authorities and other agencies to tackle 
environmental crime by co-ordinating a national enforcement 
network, targeting offenders and overseeing remediation.
•  Enforcing Regulations such as Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment (WEEE), Restriction of Hazardous Substances 
(RoHS) and substances that deplete the ozone layer.
•  Prosecuting those who flout environmental law and damage the 
environment.
Water Management
•  Monitoring and reporting on the quality of rivers, lakes, 
transitional and coastal waters of Ireland and groundwaters; 
measuring water levels and river flows.
•  National coordination and oversight of the Water Framework 
Directive.
•  Monitoring and reporting on Bathing Water Quality.
Monitoring, Analysing and Reporting on the 
Environment
•  Monitoring air quality and implementing the EU Clean Air for 
Europe (CAFÉ) Directive.
•  Independent reporting to inform decision making by national 
and local government (e.g. periodic reporting on the State of 
Ireland’s Environment and Indicator Reports).
Regulating Ireland’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions
•  Preparing Ireland’s greenhouse gas inventories and projections.
•  Implementing the Emissions Trading Directive, for over 100 of 
the largest producers of carbon dioxide in Ireland.
Environmental Research and Development
•  Funding environmental research to identify pressures, inform 
policy and provide solutions in the areas of climate, water and 
sustainability.
Strategic Environmental Assessment
•  Assessing the impact of proposed plans and programmes on the 
Irish environment (e.g. major development plans).
Radiological Protection
•  Monitoring radiation levels, assessing exposure of people in 
Ireland to ionising radiation.
•  Assisting in developing national plans for emergencies arising 
from nuclear accidents.
•  Monitoring developments abroad relating to nuclear 
installations and radiological safety.
•  Providing, or overseeing the provision of, specialist radiation 
protection services.
Guidance, Accessible Information and Education
•  Providing advice and guidance to industry and the public on 
environmental and radiological protection topics.
•  Providing timely and easily accessible environmental 
information to encourage public participation in environmental 
decision-making (e.g. My Local Environment, Radon Maps).
•  Advising Government on matters relating to radiological safety 
and emergency response.
•  Developing a National Hazardous Waste Management Plan to 
prevent and manage hazardous waste.
Awareness Raising and Behavioural Change
•  Generating greater environmental awareness and influencing 
positive behavioural change by supporting businesses, 
communities and householders to become more resource 
efficient.
•  Promoting radon testing in homes and workplaces and 
encouraging remediation where necessary.
Management and structure of the EPA
The EPA is managed by a full time Board, consisting of a Director 
General and five Directors. The work is carried out across five 
Offices:
•  Office of Environmental Sustainability
•  Office of Environmental Enforcement
•  Office of Evidence and Assessment
•  Office of Radiation Protection and Environmental Monitoring
•  Office of Communications and Corporate Services
The EPA is assisted by an Advisory Committee of twelve members 
who meet regularly to discuss issues of concern and provide 
advice to the Board.
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Executive Summary
Many countries are incentivising the take-up of low-
carbon and resource-efficient technologies such as 
waste-to-energy, wind, solar photovoltaic and biomass 
heating systems. These technologies are particularly 
attractive for local citizen investors because of their 
maturity, modularity, high reliability and the simplicity of 
the energy generation process. However, they face a 
number of barriers to widespread deployment.
Ireland has encountered considerable challenges 
in transitioning to a low-carbon resource-efficient 
economy. European Union emissions and renewables 
targets are not on track to being met, leaving the 
exchequer potentially exposed to several hundred 
million euros in possible fines.
Opposition to distributed energy technologies in 
local communities, often manifesting as objections to 
planning permissions for wind energy developments, 
has emerged as a key barrier to meeting renewable 
objectives. In Ireland, in contrast to countries 
such as Denmark and Germany, there are few 
examples of citizen and community renewable 
projects. In response, in its 2016 White Paper, the 
Irish Government committed to promoting “energy 
citizenship” and providing support for local community-
led and shared ownership projects. However, 
designing cost-effective financial incentives that are 
attractive to local citizen investors is challenging.
The objective of this study is to make policy 
recommendations for the design and implementation 
of policy supports to promote community and citizen 
investment in these assets. We present findings from 
a literature review, national and international case 
studies, and a survey of Irish citizens.
A survey of Irish citizens conducted for this research 
suggests that 40% of respondents would be willing 
to invest and 38% of respondents may be willing to 
invest in distributed renewable energy technologies. 
However, the amounts people are willing to invest are 
low relative to project costs: 31% of those willing to 
invest indicated that they would invest up to €500, with 
a further 25% of respondents willing to invest between 
€500 and €2000, and a further 22% willing to invest 
between €2000 and €5000. Only 7% of those willing 
to invest would invest more than €10,000. Wealthier 
cohorts with some experience of making investment 
decisions were more likely to consider investing. 
Key barriers to financial citizen participation include 
insufficient savings and no access to loan finance.
These findings suggest that while smaller scale 
projects (circa 5 megawatt (MW)) could be fully 
community owned, co-development with professional 
project developers is necessary for citizen involvement 
in larger projects.
The international case studies illustrate that citizens 
can be mobilised as investors. This is true not only 
in countries with a long history of citizen investment 
(Germany and Denmark), but also in jurisdictions 
where this tradition is not evident (the UK and Ontario).
Key findings that emerge from successful examples 
internationally are as follows:
1. Effectiveness of financial incentives: Feed-in 
tariffs (FiTs), feed-in premiums (FiPs), quota 
schemes, grants and tax incentives have all been 
effectively deployed to mobilise greater levels of 
investment from local citizens. Soft loans have 
been less successful as a stand-alone instrument.
2. Instrument design over instrument choice: FiTs 
emerged as a crucial success factor in mobilising 
local citizens in many jurisdictions. However, it 
is not the instrument choice per se that is the 
key consideration, but rather the specific design 
characteristics of the chosen instrument. Where 
FiTs have been successful, they have incorporated 
design features to make them more attractive to 
citizen investors, such as differentiation according 
to project size, “adders”, contract set-asides 
and mandates. Furthermore, in some cases, 
FiPs and quota-based schemes have also been 
successfully designed with citizen investors in 
mind.
3. Early-stage grant supports: Introducing 
incentives to overcome risks at the early 
(feasibility and development) stages is of crucial 
importance if local citizens are to be mobilised. 
Grants have been successfully introduced to 
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address early-stage barriers, for example in 
Denmark, where construction costs were initially 
part grant aided. Grant programmes require 
ongoing monitoring and assessment so that 
pitfalls in using them are avoided.
4. Soft loans: In combination with other incentives, 
the availability of soft loans (Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW) in Germany and the “ethical” 
Fælleskassen Bank in Denmark) was an important 
factor in promoting citizen investment. Additionally, 
non-recourse loans have been used effectively to 
address early-stage barriers to citizen investment 
in the UK and Ontario.
5. Migrating to market-based incentives: Time-
bound grants can be important for pilot projects 
and can therefore perform an important function 
in immature markets. The objective should be to 
transition to market-based supports over time.
6. Tax incentives: Favourable tax treatment of 
income from renewable energy projects emerges 
as important for the business case of many 
community renewable energy projects. The GmbH 
& Co. KG structure in Germany and the guild 
structure in Denmark significantly increased post-
tax returns to citizen investors.
7. Agency support for technical expertise: 
Incentives should be introduced as part of policy 
packages, with ancillary measures addressing 
lack of familiarity with the technology, technology 
immaturity or low awareness of the incentive 
programme itself. Informational, advisory and 
technical support services will be required to 
support citizen investors; these are best provided 
through an independent and trusted intermediary, 
e.g. CARES in Scotland.
8. Planning and grid access: Streamlined planning, 
FiT application and grid access procedures were 
an essential enabler of rapid deployment of citizen 
renewable energy, particularly in Germany. If 
these conditions are not present, grid access 
can act as a key barrier to community and citizen 
participation.
9. Mandates: Mandating a certain percentage of 
citizen or community ownership has been effective 
in mobilising community investment in Ontario and 
Denmark; in contrast, voluntary targets were less 
effective in the UK.
10. Concerted policy attention: Jurisdictions that do 
not have a tradition of citizen financial participation 
(such as the UK or Ontario) have particular 
challenges in mobilising investment from these 
non-traditional investors. It takes time to seed 
awareness and build the capacities of local actors, 
requiring persistent policy focus over time.
11. Typical business models: The design and 
choice of financial incentives can influence the 
types of business models that emerge as vehicles 
for community and citizen participation. In many 
jurisdictions, typical business models have 
emerged for both developer- and community-led 
projects, reducing transaction costs and increasing 
cost-effectiveness.
We proceed to making the following policy 
recommendations for Ireland:
1. Target setting: Setting a target for community 
ownership would underpin the commitment to 
local ownership outlined in the 2014 Energy White 
Paper and would provide regulatory stability for 
investors. The Scottish targets (500 MW over a 
5-year period) could be used as a benchmark.
2. Grants for community-led projects: There is 
a case for the introduction of a time-bound grant 
programme covering feasibility, development and 
(a portion of) construction costs to promote fully 
community-owned projects. These will generally 
be small-scale (circa 5 MW) schemes. A pilot 
programme with good geographical spread would 
promote the emergence of exemplar projects, 
which would serve to illustrate what is possible 
across Ireland.
3. Market-based incentives for community-led 
projects: A grant-based programme might 
eventually be succeeded by a technology- and 
size-differentiated FiT programme for smaller 
projects, combined with non-recourse loans 
covering early-stage project costs.
4. Co-operative structures: There is a case for 
promoting the growth of the co-operative form for 
community-led projects. This can be achieved 
by delivering favourable tax treatment of profits, 
which is a key consideration for citizen investors.
5. FiP or quota scheme for developer-let projects: 
A market-based incentive programme (either a FiP 
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or a quota-based scheme) targeting professional 
developers can be designed to favour equity 
participation from local citizens and community 
groups.
6. Mandates: If a FiP is chosen, a mandate requiring 
a share offer to local citizens (as in Denmark) 
should be considered.
7. Quota scheme: In the case of a quota-type 
scheme, the award criteria could favour 
higher levels of equity participation from local 
communities and citizens (as in Ontario).
8. Managing risk for citizen investors: Given 
project risk at the pre-construction and 
construction phases, one option is for the project 
developer to offer a preference share to local 
citizen or community groups at the early stage 
of project development. This would allow the 
local community to be part of the development 
without putting any capital at risk. If the wind farm 
becomes operational, the preference shareholders 
will receive dividends (subject to covenants of 
senior lenders).
9. Community benefit scheme: In some cases, 
where there is a low appetite for local investment, 
an option for an enhanced community benefit 
scheme for neighbours or near-neighbours 
might be considered. This could take the form 
of subsidised electricity bills or a straightforward 
payment for local citizens.

11 Project Background and Introduction
1.1 Introduction
If the ambitious objectives of the international 
community, as set out in the Paris Agreement of 
December 2015, are to be met, rapid decarbonisation 
is required over the coming decades, particularly in 
developed countries. Many industrialised countries are 
incentivising the uptake of low-carbon and resource-
efficient technologies such as waste-to-energy, wind, 
solar photovoltaic (PV), and biomass heating systems, 
which alone have the potential to make a very 
substantial contribution to global decarbonisation by 
2050 (IEA, 2015).
It is notable that these technologies are particularly 
attractive to local citizen investors who are acting 
individually, as a member of a community group or 
as party to a project by a professional developer 
(Enzensberger et al., 2003). This is because of their 
maturity, modularity, high reliability, the simplicity of the 
energy generation process and availability of technical 
service providers (Yildiz, 2014).
These technologies, however, face a number of 
barriers when it comes to widespread deployment; 
this means that their full potential cannot not realised. 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), policy must address these barriers 
to enable the full theoretical potential for mitigation to 
be realised. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, these barriers 
are not just technical and economic, but also relate 
to socio-economic, regulatory and institutional factors 
(IPCC-WGIII, 2001, p. 752).
The focus of this report is on addressing two of the 
key barriers identified in the IPCC typology: financial 
barriers (and the consequent investment shortfall in 
low-carbon technologies (LCTs) (section 1.2)), and 
lack of social support among citizens for low-carbon 
transition (section 1.3). These barriers are discussed 
in turn, focusing on the potential for citizen investment 
to address them.
1.2 The Financial Barrier
The International Energy Agency estimated that an 
investment of US$44 trillion in a portfolio of LCTs will 
be required in the period 2015–2050 to decarbonise 
the energy system in line with a 2°C climate mitigation 
target (IEA, 2014). Access to and cost of capital is 
a central determinant of the pace at which relevant 
technologies will be adopted. Traditional investors, 
such as financial institutions, utilities or businesses, 
have been active in providing private finance for LCTs; 
however, for a variety of reasons, funding may not be 
available at the necessary scale. For example, the 
financial sector may not be attracted to low-carbon and 
resource-efficient projects because technologies have 
longer payback periods and higher upfront investment 
costs (Zhang et al., 2012). Investors may have biased 
perceptions and preconceptions that favour status quo 
energy production models over innovative alternatives 
(Masini and Menichetti, 2013); or they may perceive 
new technologies to be riskier and unreliable (IPCC, 
2011).
The challenge of attracting finance into low-carbon 
and resource-efficient markets may have been 
exacerbated since the financial crisis by a “change 
in the business logic of the financial sector” including 
“a very significant increase in investment in financial 
products, an associated orientation towards short-
term and speculative investments” (Jones, 2015). 
Traditional banks are struggling with stricter reserve 
requirements under Basel III reform measures; 
adequate finance is also not likely to come from 
sovereign or utility balance sheets (Simshauser, 2010; 
Haigh, 2011; Eleftheriadis and Anagnostopoulou, 
2015). For these reasons, the adequate mobilisation 
of financial resources may require public investments 
to be greatly increased and/or a reform of the financial 
system (Jacobsson and Jacobsson, 2012). New 
sources of capital for investment in low-carbon assets 
are required.
Within this context, there is potentially a much greater 
role to be played by local citizen investors. The 
relevant technologies are modular, often relatively 
small scale (typically <50 megawatt (MW) installed 
capacity) compared with traditional fossil fuel and 
nuclear generation (typically hundreds of MW), and 
decentralised, making them more financially appealing 
to local citizen investors and somewhat less so to 
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traditional investor classes (Yildiz, 2014). Furthermore, 
individuals tend to control more funds than has 
historically been the case because of changes in 
pension regulation and administration (Colonial, 2013). 
Citizen participation schemes and local community 
ownership have therefore been identified as a potential 
source of private finance for low-carbon and resource-
efficient technologies (Bergek and Berggren, 2014). 
For these reasons, promoting greater levels of citizen 
investment is seen as an approach to addressing the 
investment shortfall and overcoming financial barriers 
to investment.
1.3 Societal “Buy-in”
Individuals and communities may be slow to accept 
new technologies for various reasons, and addressing 
the issue of societal acceptability is therefore of crucial 
importance for low-carbon transition (Wüstenhagen 
et al., 2007). National accounts of the successes and 
failures of low-carbon transition identify community 
and societal acceptance not only as a potentially 
significant barrier, but also as a key enabler of success 
(Shackley and Green, 2007; Wolsink, 2007; Walker, 
2011; Sovacool and Lakshmi Ratan, 2012; Szarka et 
al., 2012; Stokes, 2013).
Figure 1.1. Overcoming barriers to decarbonisation. Source: IPCC-WGIII (2001).
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The ability to share local value is one of the key means 
of building social support for low-carbon transition. 
Engaging local citizens as investors can help to 
promote behaviour changes such as conserving 
energy and reducing emissions (Heiskanen et al., 
2010). Community group and individual citizen 
investment in LCTs can generate local income, result 
in more locally appropriate developments that are 
more likely to secure planning permission, contribute 
to understanding of climate and energy security 
issues, and create niches that positively interact with 
the wider regime in various ways (Devine-Wright, 
2005; Rogers et al., 2008; Bergman and Eyre, 2011; 
Palm and Tengvard, 2011; Parag et al., 2013; Viardot, 
2013; Devine-Wright, 2014; Bolton and Foxon, 2015; 
Dóci et al., 2015; Slee, 2015).
The experience of investing in a LCT can also 
positively dispose citizens to making future low-carbon 
investments (Dobbyn and Thomas, 2005; Keirstead, 
2007; Boon and Dieperink, 2014), and greater levels 
of local ownership have also been found to coincide 
with higher rates of wind power deployment than 
“remote, corporate ownership” (Toke et al., 2008). 
Mobilising citizen investors has the potential to build 
resilience to climate change at a local level. It can also 
improve the cost-effectiveness of low-carbon transition 
by opening up optimal sites for developments that 
could otherwise not be accessed and by mobilising 
actors to devote time and effort on a voluntary basis 
(Rijpens et al., 2013; IEA-RETD, 2016; Nelson et al., 
2016). This could have the effect of allowing more 
onshore development of wind power, for example, and 
therefore a reduction of the need for more expensive 
offshore wind power development.
A key means of building understanding and support for 
low-carbon transition is by promoting local ownership 
of distributed renewable energy technologies, and 
thereby ensuring some local benefit from technology 
deployment. While low social acceptability can act as 
a barrier to low-carbon transition, this obstacle can 
be addressed by ensuring benefits and opportunities 
arising are accessible to all cohorts in society.
1.4 Irish Policy Context
The financial barrier and social acceptability 
challenges have traditionally been addressed in 
policy with different instruments. Economic and 
financial incentives, measures that provide actors 
with monetary compensation to adopt particular 
technologies (Mickwitz, 2003; Bergek and Berggren, 
2014), have typically been introduced to mobilise 
greater levels of capital investment (Painuly, 2001; 
IEA, 2003; De Serres et al., 2010). On the other 
hand, education, information, labelling, community 
involvement in policymaking, community engagement 
and awareness-raising campaigns are recommended 
to address citizen and community acceptance issues 
(Owen, 2006; Verbruggen et al., 2010). What is less 
commonly recognised is that these two barriers are 
interrelated, overlapping, and to some extent, mutually 
reinforcing (Yildiz, 2014; Juntunen and Hyysalo, 2015).
Given the importance of investment shortfalls and 
social acceptability challenges, there is an increased 
policy focus in many countries on approaches that 
mobilise local citizens as investors in low-carbon 
and resource-efficient assets. The interest in local 
citizens as investors, as well as the levels of financial 
citizen participation, however, varies widely between 
countries (Curtin et al., 2016). In a select number of 
countries, such as Germany and Denmark, there is a 
long tradition of mobilising local citizens as investors, 
both as individuals or as members of community 
groups (Chapter 3), whereas in many other countries, 
including Ireland, there has been a more modest 
involvement from local citizens.
Over the past decade, there has been a growing 
interest in mobilizing citizen investment from countries 
that do not have a long tradition of doing so. For 
example, the UK Energy Infrastructure Act (2015) 
sets out a framework pursuant to which the secretary 
of state may introduce regulations under which local 
residents and communities would have the right to a 
buy a minimum of 5% equity ownership in renewable 
energy projects in their area (DECC, 2015a). The 
Scottish Government outlined policies in 2015 in which 
wind farm developers have to demonstrate that at 
least 10% equity ownership has been offered to local 
individuals and community groups before applying for 
planning permission (Scottish Government, 2015). 
Ontario’s Green Energy and Green Economy Act 
(GEGEA) of 2009 introduced a feed-in tariff (FIT) 
regime with strong incentives for community-owned 
projects (Ontario Power Authority, 2009). Furthermore, 
in 2016 the Québec government proposed a 
“new energy pact” as part of which it will promote 
partnerships between energy project developers and 
local communities (Government of Québec, 2016).
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Within this context, Ireland is an interesting case. 
Policy, in particular the introduction of a FiT (the 
Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) Scheme) 
in 2006, has been successfully attracting investment 
capital to the wind sector. Wind energy has expanded 
rapidly, reaching 24% of total energy generated in 
2014 (IWEA, 2017).
However, according to the European Commission, 
Ireland lags behind considerably in achieving its 
renewable energy targets (EC, 2017). Its current 
trajectory of renewable energy growth suggests that 
the shortfall in the target of several per cent may rise 
by 2020 (SEAI, 2017a). In early 2016, former Minister 
for Energy, Alex White, told Dáil Éireann that the cost 
of each percentage point shortfall “may be in the range 
of €100 million to €150 million” annually.
In contrast to Germany and Denmark, investment 
in wind has been almost entirely dominated by Irish 
utilities and professional project developers. There 
is only one wind farm of 3.9 MW held in community 
ownership from a total installed capacity of 3000 MW 
(see Chapter 3). Furthermore, there are very few 
examples of citizen and community-owned solar, 
hydro, waste-to-energy or biomass plants.
While there has traditionally been a widespread 
acceptance of the need for distributed renewable 
and wind power among Irish citizens, a “sea change 
in social support” for wind energy and related 
infrastructure has been identified (NESC, 2014). Local 
opposition to renewables deployment has emerged 
as a major barrier to low-carbon development and 
has made deploying renewable projects increasingly 
challenging. One possible consequence is that 
Ireland may find it increasingly challenging to meet its 
legally binding EU commitment, which opens up the 
possibility of fines for non-compliance (Curtin, 2016). 
For these reasons, the Government’s Irish Energy 
White Paper (2014) places a considerable emphasis 
on “energy citizenship”. It envisages a transition 
from an energy system “that is almost exclusively 
Government and utility led, to one where citizens 
and communities will increasingly be participants” 
and includes commitments for “providing funding 
and supports for community-led projects in the initial 
stages of development, planning and construction” 
and “examining shared ownership opportunities for 
renewable energy projects in local communities” 
(DCENR, 2015).
1.5 Project Objectives and 
Methodology
The design of financial incentives that are attractive 
to local citizen investors is an underdeveloped theme 
in the academic literature (Stigka et al., 2014; Yildiz, 
2014). A number of approaches have been employed 
in different contexts, with widely varied results in terms 
of environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness 
and distributional justice. It is therefore important 
for researchers and policymakers to understand 
the different experiences, capacities, priorities and 
motivations of local citizen investors when designing 
policy interventions such as financial incentives. 
Furthermore, in the literature, it is an open question 
whether or not the successes achieved in countries 
such as Denmark and Germany can be replicated in 
other countries. Some studies (Dewald and Truffer, 
2011; Romero-Rubio and de Andrés Díaz, 2015) 
identify context-specific enabling factors, which 
suggest that experiences might not be transferable.
For these reasons, there is considerable value in 
exploring the experiences of countries and the different 
attitudes and experiences towards promoting financial 
citizen participation. Within this context, this project’s 
objective were:
1. to identify international best practice in creating 
financial incentives for investment in low-carbon 
and resource-efficient technologies, focusing on 
“non-traditional” investors such as individuals and 
communities; and
2. to make recommendations for the design and 
implementation of financial incentives targeted at 
individuals or community groups in Ireland that will 
be socially inclusive and attract capital to these 
assets.
In order to achieve these objectives, the research 
approach employed was to progress from a general to 
increasingly specific analytical focus, over four discrete 
work packages (Figure 1.2).
1.6 Report Structure
This report presents the output from each of these 
work packages. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive 
literature review on the use of financial incentives 
aimed at individuals and communities to attract 
capital to low-carbon and energy-efficient sectors. 
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This is followed in Chapter 3 by a presentation of four 
in-depth case studies exploring the use of financial 
incentives and the common business models that have 
emerged in response to these incentives. Chapter 4 
assesses the use of financial incentives in Ireland to 
promote investment from citizens and communities in 
low-carbon and resource-efficient assets. Chapter 5 
presents preliminary results from a survey undertaken 
on the attitudes of Irish citizens to investing in wind, 
solar, biomass and waste-to-energy projects. Chapter 
6 concludes with policy recommendations and 
proposals for the design of socially inclusive financial 
incentives based on the findings from previous work 
packages.
Figure 1.2. Research approach.
62 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
While the case for promoting citizen and community 
investment in low-carbon and resource-efficient 
assets is well developed, in the literature the question 
remains as to whether or not economic and financial 
incentives (EFIs) have been successful in mobilising 
local citizen investment in these sectors. While many 
studies have evaluated citizens’ willingness to pay a 
premium, usually via energy bills, for renewable power 
(Kostakis and Sardianou, 2012; Soon and Ahmad, 
2015), by contrast, the literature on citizen participation 
in the financing of LCTs is underdeveloped (Stigka et 
al., 2014; Yildiz, 2014) and the design and use of EFIs 
worldwide (e.g. for promoting the uptake of energy-
efficient technologies) has not been comprehensively 
studied (de la Rue du Can et al., 2014). According 
to Yildiz (2014, p. 678) “the literature on citizen 
participation in the financing of renewable energy 
infrastructures is sparse considering its empirical 
importance.”
Within this context, we undertook a systematic 
literature review of EFIs that are directed towards local 
citizen investors and aimed at mobilising investments 
in LCTs. The findings of this review were published 
in the Journal of Sustainable and Renewable Energy 
Reviews (Curtin et al., 2016) and are summarised in 
this chapter.
The following section presents a methodology for the 
systematic literature review. This is followed by an 
analysis of the findings of relevant studies identified, 
highlighting strengths, weaknesses and opportunities 
for further research, and we conclude with key policy 
insights.
2.2 Determining Studies of Interest
For systematic literature reviews to be robust it is 
important to clearly define the studies that will be 
included and excluded. According to the IPCC, 
qualitative analyses and case studies complement 
statistical analyses by capturing the effects of policies 
and institutions on other aspects of the system 
and the effect of institutional, social and political 
factors on policy success (Somanathan, 2014). We 
therefore included both quantitative and qualitative 
ex post assessments covering the impact of policy 
interventions, including reviews of empirical evidence 
and interviews with and surveys of individual citizens 
and community groups.
“Downstream” incentives targeting individuals and 
communities were our primary focus. We excluded 
evaluations of “upstream” incentives targeting 
manufacturers and “midstream” incentives targeting 
retailers (de la Rue du Can et al., 2014). Energy 
efficiency obligation schemes and emissions trading 
schemes, which are targeted primarily at companies, 
were therefore excluded, as were evaluations of 
how EFIs affect investment decisions by companies. 
We also excluded studies focusing on institutional 
investors (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007; Mathews 
et al., 2010; Barradale, 2014; Bolton and Foxon, 
2015) and general assessments of the effectiveness 
of EFIs (Mickwitz, 2003; Marques and Fuinhas, 
2012; Bobinaite and Tarvydas, 2014; Ozcan, 2014; 
Somanathan, 2014; Polzin et al., 2015) that did 
not explicitly consider implications for local citizen 
investors.
EFIs are generally distinguished from regulatory 
instruments (command and control), informational 
and co-operative (or voluntary) policy interventions 
(Mickwitz, 2003), and studies covering these policy 
interventions are therefore also excluded. EFIs can 
be further subdivided into those that are technology 
specific or technology neutral. The former might 
include, for example, an incentive to purchase a low-
carbon vehicle or low-carbon heating system. The 
latter, on the other hand, would include instruments 
such as carbon taxation (Bergek and Berggren, 2014; 
Sierzchula et al., 2014). We included technology-
specific economic incentives in this review, but studies 
that address general instruments such as carbon 
taxation were included only insofar as they were 
relevant to assessing the merit of a technology-specific 
incentive.
In practice, this implied a focus on a specific set of 
EFIs. Further to analysis of the International Energy 
Agency’s comprehensive database of economic 
incentives that have been implemented in the building, 
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energy and transport sectors to promote LCTs (IEA, 
2017), the IPCC’s typology of sector-specific economic 
incentives (Somanathan et al., 2014, p. 1158) and 
reviews of several comprehensive analyses on 
financial incentives for renewables (Cansino et al., 
2011; Solangi et al., 2011), we identified the following 
four categories of incentive for inclusion:
1. FiT, feed-in premium (FiP) and quota schemes1
2. tax incentives
3. grants and subsidies
4. “soft” loans
Several of these EFIs (in particular FiTs and quota 
schemes) often target large investors; therefore, 
only studies that explicitly considered the impacts on 
individuals and communities were included.
We first present in section 2.3 general findings from 
our review below, before evaluating the literature on 
each of these four categories of incentive.
2.3 General Use of Financial 
Incentives
There is a significant body of research that is not 
specific to a particular type of EFI, which identifies 
factors that influence the attractiveness of these 
incentives to local citizen investors. This work, much 
of it from the field of behavioural economics, suggests 
that, while some individual citizens may respond to 
EFIs in an “economically rational” manner, this will not 
always be the case. For example, a number of studies 
identified the potential importance of social comparison 
and the influence of peers and neighbours in the 
community as a factor that can have either a positive 
or negative impact on LCT investment decisions 
(Allcott, 2011; Palm and Tengvard, 2011; Costa and 
Kahn, 2013; Frederiks et al., 2015; Schultz, 2015).
Frederiks et al. (2015) identified several behavioural 
factors that need to be considered when designing 
1  A FiT is an agreement to pay a guaranteed amount over a set period of time for certain types of renewable heat and electricity. 
A guaranteed price tariff is a FiT scheme where a set rate is paid for each unit of electricity generated and supplied to the grid. 
FiPs are similar to FiTs, except that in this case a fixed premium is added to the market price when exporting electricity to the 
grid (Couture and Gagnon, 2010). There are two broad categories of quota scheme. Quotas with tradable green certificates are 
certificates issued for every unit of renewable electricity. They allow generators to obtain additional revenue from the sale of 
electricity. Demand for certificates originates from an obligation on electricity distributors to surrender a number of certificates as a 
share of their annual consumption (quota). Under tendering/bidding systems, on the other hand, the government invites renewable 
electricity generators to compete for either a financial budget or renewable electricity generation capacity. Within each technology 
band, the cheapest bids are awarded contracts and receive the subsidy (del Río and Bleda, 2012)
EFIs, including myopia (high discounting of future 
benefits) and status quo biases. The prevalence 
of myopia in low-carbon purchasing decisions is a 
particularly well-developed theme (Lane and Potter, 
2007; Metcalfe and Dolan, 2012), which may render 
individuals resistant to investing in LCTs even when 
EFIs are strong. Schultz (2015) found that, in addition 
to EFIs, strategies such as prompts, commitments, 
feedback and convenience can effectively promote 
pro-environmental behaviour – at least in some 
contexts and for some behaviours and individuals. 
Frederiks et al. (2015) and Rode et al. (2015) 
identified the potential for EFIs to “crowd out” intrinsic 
motivation, highlighting the importance of anticipating 
changes in an individual’s motivational structures 
prior to “large-scale implementation” of EFIs so that 
negative or unintended impacts are avoided (Rode et 
al., 2015).
These findings highlight the importance of considering 
EFIs as part of wider policy interventions (Michelsen 
and Madlener, 2016) and the need for complimentary, 
or in some cases supplementary, policy interventions 
in addition to EFIs (Lane and Potter, 2007) to promote 
investments in LCTs from local citizens. These 
interventions could include, inter alia, information 
provision or using the power of social comparison. 
It should be noted, however, that Momsen and 
Stoerk (2014) found that using social comparison as 
a “nudge” was ineffective in prompting individuals 
to choose renewable energy (Momsen and Stoerk, 
2014).
A further strong conclusion from the literature is the 
importance of considering the target demographic 
when designing EFIs and the importance of avoiding 
“one size fits all” solutions. Several studies found 
that demographic characteristics such as gender, 
age and income are important factors in determining 
likelihood of investing in LCTs (Egbue and Long, 
2012; Fraune, 2015; Greenberg, 2009; Kosenius and 
Ollikainen, 2013). Kosenius and Ollikainen (2013) 
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additionally found that regional differences existed in 
preferences for renewable energy in Finland. It is not 
just demographic characteristics that are relevant, 
however. Coad et al. (2009) found that responsiveness 
to EFIs varies by personality type, while West et al. 
(2010) found that “worldview” would also influence 
responsiveness to EFIs (Coad et al., 2009; West et al., 
2010).
These findings underscore the importance of market 
segmentation techniques to identify sections of the 
public that are more likely to invest in a particular LCT, 
such as early adopters (Lane and Potter, 2007), and 
to tailor incentives and measures to these markets. 
For example, information provision policies (such 
as the energy labelling for cars) may be effective in 
encouraging certain intrinsically motivated consumers 
to adopt green cars, whereas EFIs may be more 
persuasive for extrinsically motivated consumers 
(Coad et al., 2009). It should be noted, however, that 
the potential downside of this approach is that it could 
mobilise opposition from excluded sections of society 
(West et al., 2010). Furthermore, where EFIs are not 
cost-effective, they can result in increased electricity 
prices or taxes, with the potential to undermine “buy-
in” from wider society (see also sections 3.2 and 3.3).
A related, though somewhat less developed, theme 
explores differences between traditional investors 
and “new” local citizen investors. Bergek et al. (2013) 
and Linnerud and Holden (2015) found that investors 
in LCTs come from heterogeneous groups – from 
traditional investor classes to non-traditional small-
scale investors such as farmers’ associations and 
individuals. Non-traditional investors may have varied 
levels of experience and divergent motivations for 
investing (Bergek et al., 2013; Linnerud and Holden, 
2015) and may also have less business experience 
and financial strength than traditional investors 
(Bergek et al., 2013; Salm et al., 2016); non-traditional 
investors may have different investment preferences 
as a result (Salm et al., 2016). What therefore 
emerges from this subset of the literature is the 
need for discrete EFIs that are specifically targeted 
towards the needs of local citizen investors, who 
will have different experiences, capacities, priorities 
and motivations compared with professional project 
developers. There are opportunities to explore the 
specific types of incentives that might be attractive to 
these groups.
There are a considerable number of studies that 
identify the importance of the characteristics of 
the technology itself in the effectiveness of EFIs in 
motivating investments in LCTs. Some studies, such 
as Palm and Tengvar (2011), Stigka et al. (2014) 
and Claudy et al. (2010), found that socio-economic 
characteristics, trust, acceptance, knowledge and 
understanding of the LCT in question can impact 
willingness to pay and invest in a particular LCT. 
These factors may also be prevalent when it comes 
to purchasing electric vehicles, where a lack of 
consumer confidence (Steinhilber et al., 2013) or 
uncertainty associated with the reliability of battery 
technology (Egbue and Long, 2012) may render EFIs 
ineffective in mobilising LCT investments. These 
studies highlight the importance of technology maturity 
and the perceived advantages of one technology over 
another (Claudy et al., 2010; Egbue and Long, 2012) 
in motivating individual investment decisions, and they 
underscore the importance of supplementary policies 
aimed at promoting understanding and acceptance 
of emerging technologies in addition to strong EFIs. 
This may include education and awareness raising, 
establishing trusted standards and regulations, 
or supporting strong warranties on emerging 
technologies.
While some literature exists on the effectiveness of 
EFIs in incentivising individuals to investment in LCTs, 
there are comparatively few studies that assess the 
general effectiveness of EFIs in promoting participation 
in community energy schemes. Whereas Hoffman 
and High-Pippert (2010) found that participants 
in community renewable energy schemes are 
motivated by contributing to the community as well 
as by economic considerations (Hoffman and High-
Pippert, 2010), Dóci and Vasileiadou (2015) found 
that personal gain was the primary motivating factor, 
although they also noted that other secondary hedonic 
and environmental motivations were also present. 
There is an opportunity, therefore, for further research 
to explore the relative importance and effectiveness of 
EFIs in motivating participation in community energy 
schemes (sections 3.2 and 3.3).
Finally, several studies highlight institutional and 
regulatory barriers, such as applying for planning 
permission, as important factors when considering 
LCT investment decisions. Palm and Tengvar (2011) 
found, for example, that rules by grid companies and 
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regulations are considered a hindrance to investment 
in micro-LCTs, whereas other studies highlighted 
fragmented infrastructure (Egbue and Long, 2012) and 
the absence of standards and regulations (Steinhilber 
et al., 2013) as factors that may render EFIs less 
effective and potentially less attractive to local citizens 
unless they can be addressed.
2.4 FiTs, FiPs and Quota-based 
Schemes
The most popular EFIs to promote the adoption of 
renewable electricity are guaranteed price FiT and 
quota systems (Dusonchet and Telaretti, 2010), 
although FiPs are becoming an increasingly common 
instrument (Ragwitz et al., 2012). FiTs have also been 
used to promote the adoption of renewable heating 
systems, though less commonly so (Cansino et al., 
2011). For the most part, these EFIs have been used 
to mobilise investments from professional project 
developers, project developers and utilities (Cansino 
et al., 2011), although the focus here is on their 
attractiveness to citizens and communities.
Some studies indicated that FiTs have advantages 
over quota-based schemes when it comes to 
promoting growth in community-owned generation 
(Meyer, 2003; Walker, 2008; West et al., 2010). An 
important factor here is the actual FiT level, as some 
countries offer higher FiT rates than others, and 
these countries have generally witnessed greater 
renewables deployment but reduced economic 
effectiveness. Fouquet and Johansson (2008) found 
that FiTs could be more appropriate for small and 
medium-sized investors, whereas quota schemes 
could create investment risk for independent power 
producers and opportunities for market dominance 
by larger players. Several studies found that FiTs 
could boost social legitimacy for deployment of wind 
turbines (Butler and Neuhoff, 2008; del Río and Bleda, 
2012; Mabee et al., 2012), while others found that 
quota schemes tended to favour large wind farms 
at the expense of smaller independent producers 
and had resulted in a geographical concentration of 
development (Feurtey et al., 2015).
An integral design feature of FiTs that makes them 
attractive to local citizen investors is the guaranteed 
level of support they provide over time, which results 
in additional investment security (Lipp, 2011; Mabee 
et al., 2012; Saunders et al., 2012; Dóci et al., 2015; 
Lipp et al., 2016). Sovacool and Lakshmi Ratan (2012) 
found that the certainty provided by the long-term FiTs 
resulted in access to lower cost finance for German 
individual investors, whereas Dóci and Vasileiadou 
(2015) concluded that governmental policies should 
provide long-term and calculable EFIs such as FiTs 
to support these groups. This may be a particularly 
important consideration for local citizen investors, 
given their relative lack of capital compared with 
traditional investors.
It is unclear, however, if FiTs are the best option when 
it comes to attracting local citizen investors. Some 
studies identify the importance of specific design 
features of an EFI over instrument choice. Mabee 
et al. (2012), for example, found that the German 
FiT system identified a wider range of project sizes 
compared with a Canadian FiT scheme, thus offering 
more opportunities for local benefit. Saunders et al. 
(2012) found that a quota scheme that was introduced 
in the UK in 2002 was unappealing to community 
groups because of a number of unattractive design 
features, including the complexity of the scheme. On 
the other hand, Linnerud and Holden (2015) found 
that the short duration and the abrupt termination 
of a quota and tradable green certificate scheme in 
Norway compared with a Swedish scheme contributed 
to additional risk and transaction costs, which made it 
less attractive to new investor classes. Feurtey et al. 
(2015) found that a specifically designed community 
quota, stipulating that at least 30% of profits were to 
be redistributed to local communities, had contributed 
greatly to improving the level of local acceptance in 
Québec. They therefore concluded that FiTs may 
be suitable for small projects (under 10 MW), while 
quotas could be more suited for medium and large 
projects; however, in both cases mandatory financial 
participation criteria may be required to ensure fair 
outcomes for local citizen investors.
These studies highlight the importance of designing 
EFIs with the needs of local citizen investors in mind 
(section 3.1), whatever the choice of EFI, and align 
with other research focusing on cost-effectiveness, 
which also emphasises the importance of EFI design 
over choice of instrument (Huber et al., 2007). Few 
studies, however, explicitly consider the design 
features that are most attractive to local citizen 
investors and in many cases these findings are implied 
rather than explicitly stated. These are therefore 
questions that merit further research and investigation.
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A weakness in this literature is the absence of 
studies comparing the impact of FiTs with that of 
FiPs on local citizen investors. There is growing 
policy focus on FiPs, particularly within the EU in the 
light of EU state aid guidelines, which anticipate the 
gradual replacement of FiTs with the more market-
price-dependent FiPs. There is some evidence from 
Denmark to suggest that FiPs may be off-putting to 
local citizen investors compared with FiTs (Meyer, 
2007; Gotchev, 2015) because these investors may 
be highly risk averse. It is unclear, however, whether 
it is the level of the financial incentive provided or the 
choice of instrument itself that is the more important 
factor as far as local citizen investors are concerned; 
this area merits further analytical attention.
Other studies touch on the importance of 
complementary measures to support the central EFI, 
be it a FiT, FiP or quota-based scheme. Sovacool 
and Lakshmi Ratan (2012), for example, identified 
excellent information on tariffs as an important 
supplementary measure to the German FiT. In 
many cases, complementary measures have been 
deployed to address access to capital, which has been 
identified as a key barrier to local citizen participation 
(Lipp, 2011), particularly at the riskier early project 
stages, such as feasibility assessments, pre-planning 
development work and planning applications. Yildiz 
(2014), Romero-Rubio and de Andrés Díaz (2015) and 
Saunders et al. (2012) all highlighted the availability 
of publicly supported soft loan programmes as an 
important success factor that complemented FiTs in 
promoting the growth of local citizen investment in 
LCTs in Germany. There are opportunities for further 
research into the most effective way of addressing 
early-stage project risk for local citizens, drawing on 
the experiences of different countries, as these have 
not been comprehensively studied.
Context-specific factors have also been identified in 
several studies and are an important consideration in 
successful FiT implementation. Sovacool and Lakshmi 
Ratan (2012), Dewald and Truffer (2011) and Romero-
Rubio and de Andrés Díaz (2015) found that the 
support of local citizen associations focused on energy 
and local decision-making provided the necessary 
background for successful deployment of LCTs in 
Germany. Dewald and Truffer (2011) found that market 
success was not sustainable in Spain because, by 
contrast, these necessary pre-conditions for success 
were not in place. These findings are consistent with 
those of Romero-Rubio and de Andrés Díaz (2015), 
who found that the greater focus on community energy 
in Germany compared with Spain in response to FiTs 
could be explained by a number of context-specific 
factors including, inter alia, a relatively high sensitivity 
to environmental issues and a large number of people 
with sufficient financial resources to invest. These 
findings attest to the dangers associated with coming 
to general conclusions from the experiences of a 
particular country (Romero-Rubio and de Andrés Díaz, 
2015).
Finally, some studies also identified a tension between 
mobilising local citizen investors and increasing 
electricity prices, which can have a countervailing 
impact on social legitimacy for LCTs (section 3.1). For 
example, del Río and Bleda (2012) and Butler and 
Neuhoff (2008) found that total costs of FiT schemes 
have significantly increased in countries such as 
Spain and Germany. Others, however, found that FiTs 
were a success in terms of promoting new investors 
in small-scale solar PV energy in New South Wales, 
but that the level of investor participation had been 
underestimated, resulting in cost overruns (Martin and 
Rice, 2013). While there is some evidence that using 
FiTs, quota-based schemes and other EFIs to mobilise 
local citizens as investors can reduce the overall costs 
to society or low-carbon transition by, for example, 
opening up optimal sites for renewables deployment 
(Nelson et al., 2016), this is not a topic that has been 
explored in the academic literature. These findings 
highlight the importance of careful ex ante analysis of 
incentive programmes to ensure that they deliver the 
anticipated outcomes.
2.5 Grants
Grants, generally applied as a percentage of either 
the total installed cost or capital cost of an investment, 
are a widely used instrument employed to promote 
individual and community investment in LCTs. In 
2010, grants and rebates were available in 42 of 195 
countries globally to promote low-carbon heating, 
cooling and electricity generation (Bobinaite and 
Tarvydas, 2014). Grants are the most widespread 
measure of support for the use of renewable energy 
sources for heating in the EU (Stevanović and Pucar, 
2012) and are also commonly used in the USA 
(Mundaca and Luth Richter, 2015).
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Several studies illustrate the effectiveness of grants 
in mobilising investment from individuals. It is clear 
from these studies that grants can encourage the 
adoption of capital-intensive LCTs by reducing high 
upfront costs, which is often cited as a key barrier to 
investment (Painuly, 2001; Saunders et al., 2012). 
For example, in an evaluation of grant incentives 
to promote uptake of solar water heating (SWH) 
internationally, it was found that grant programmes 
were generally successful in promoting technology 
adoption (Roulleau and Lloyd, 2008), while others 
found that a grant programme was necessary for 
deployment of micro-LCTs to achieve critical mass in 
Swedish households (Mahapatra and Gustavsson, 
2008). Chang et al. (2011) concluded that grants were 
successful in promoting SWH uptake in Taiwan (Chang 
et al., 2011), while another study found that a Chinese 
grant (covering approximately 10% of cost) for LCT 
appliances was effective in targeting some segments 
of the population (Yang and Zhao, 2015).
Grant programmes have also been identified as 
important in promoting community renewable energy 
initiatives in some studies. Madlener (2007) found that 
rapid diffusion of wood-fuelled district heating schemes 
in Vorarlberg, Austria, many of which were promoted 
locally and owned by communities and agricultural 
co-operatives, was dependent on the provision of 
attractive upfront capital grants and, to a lesser extent, 
on soft loans (Madlener, 2007). Two studies found 
that many UK community energy groups were able 
to take advantage of EFIs, in particular, but also FiTs 
(Saunders et al., 2012; Seyfang et al., 2013), while 
another study found that a grant programme was 
helpful for community wind initiatives in Oregon (Yin, 
2012).
Comprehensive assessments of grant programmes 
are, however, not common in the academic literature, 
nor are ex ante studies considering the cost-
effectiveness of these programmes. While Roulleau 
and Lloyd (2008) found a German grant programme 
to be cost-effective, they found that cost-effectiveness 
assessments were not common in the programmes 
they evaluated.
On the other hand, several potential downsides of 
grants programmes are identified in the literature. 
One potential weakness is that grants can increase 
capital and installation costs (Cansino et al., 2011). 
Chang et al. (2011) found, for example, that significant 
unit cost increases occurred over the lifetime of the 
grant programme, leading to grant increases and 
supplementary incentives from local authorities. It 
has also been suggested that to avoid technology 
cost increases, grants based on total installed costs 
or use of both performance and cost criteria in grant 
programme design might be considered. However, the 
success of schemes would then depend on the extent 
to which industry can provide both high-performance 
and low-cost systems (Roulleau and Lloyd, 2008). 
Madlener (2007) identified techno-economic 
performance guidelines that greatly improved the 
technical efficiency and economic viability of plants 
as a key success factor in ensuring a cost-effective 
programme, and Chang et al. (2011) concluded that 
greater coherence between national and regional 
initiatives could improve cost-effectiveness.
A further challenge is that grants can lead to stop–start 
investment cycles (Cansino et al., 2011), arising 
from the sudden termination of support, rather than 
the creation of a sustainable market for the LCT in 
question. Indeed, Roulleau and Lloyd (2008) found 
evidence of stop–start investment cycles in several 
of the programmes they evaluated. Seyfang et al. 
(2013) and Saunders et al. (2013) found that grants 
were important for community energy projects, but 
that a stable supply of funding is important for these 
local organisations to operate effectively in the longer 
term. Seyfang et al. (2013) found that policy and 
regulatory threats and unpredicted policy changes 
were a real problem for many projects, while Saunders 
et al. (2013) found that constantly chasing grants 
was taking up too much of members’ time. The long 
duration of the programmes, which gives confidence 
to consumers and suppliers, has been identified as 
an important design feature to counter policy and 
regulatory uncertainty.
There are also several studies that consider non-
financial success factors in grant programmes. It has 
been argued that the administrative burden of applying 
for grants can be off-putting to potential investors 
(Cansino et al., 2011) and it is therefore unsurprising 
that Yin (2012) and Madlener (2007) identified the 
simplicity of application procedure as a key success 
factor. Mahapatra and Gustavsson (2008) highlighted 
the importance of technology reliability, trust in 
installers and personal contacts for information on the 
technology, while Yang and Zhao (2015) highlighted 
the importance of knowledge, awareness and attitude 
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to products and the subsidy programme itself. These 
factors underscore the importance of supplementary 
measures to EFIs (sections 3.1 and 3.2), targeting 
additional barriers to investment and the need for 
these incentives to be considered as part of wider 
policy packages.
Some studies also highlight the differences in 
responsiveness to grant programmes in different 
geographical locations and different demographic 
cohorts. Mahapatra and Gustavsson (2008), 
for example, identified differences in individual 
preferences between Swedes and other nationalities, 
while Yang and Zhao (2015) concluded that 
moderate grants do not significantly influence the 
entire population, but effectively influence people 
from high-income households. The study concluded 
that the subsidy programme should target higher 
income groups to maximise the policy effect and that 
a tailored programme would be required to target 
low-income groups. Madlener (2007) identified the 
pioneering work of innovators and early adopters as a 
key success factor in widespread technology adoption 
and diffusion in society. There are, however, potential 
downsides to these market segmentation techniques 
(section 3.1).
2.6 Tax Incentives
Globally, tax incentives are the most widely used policy 
instrument to promote LCTs (Bobinaite and Tarvydas, 
2014). The most commonly used tax incentives are 
deductions, exemptions or reduced corporate tax rates 
for businesses and income tax rates for individuals, but 
some countries have also introduced reduced property 
taxes and VAT rates to promote LCTs (Chandrasekar 
and Kandpal, 2005; Cansino et al., 2010, 2011; 
Solangi et al., 2011; Mundaca and Luth Richter, 2015).
While there has been considerable empirical focus on 
the cost-effectiveness of carbon tax versus other EFIs 
(Markandya et al., 2009; Lin and Li, 2011; Montag, 
2015), there has been a comparatively limited focus 
in the academic literature on the effectiveness of tax 
incentives in mobilising LCT investment.
From evaluations with a focus on local citizens, it is 
clear that, like grants, tax incentives can be effective 
in mobilising investment from these actors. Roulleau 
and Lloyd (2008) found that a French scheme whereby 
a reduced VAT rate was introduced to complement 
an income tax rebate effectively promoted SWH 
deployment, as did a Greek scheme that offered 
an income tax rebate on the total installation cost. 
Another study found that a variety of state-level tax 
incentives, some of which were directed at individuals 
(including capital cost rebates, sales tax exemptions 
and property tax exemptions), had a significant 
positive impact on wind energy growth in the western 
states of the USA (Black et al., 2014). Solangi et 
al. (2011), in a review of solar policy globally, found 
that income tax credits for solar PV (used by both 
households and businesses) was the most important 
component in the growth in solar PV in the USA. Tax 
incentives have been commonly used to promote 
the purchase of low-carbon vehicles in particular and 
their impact and effectiveness has been quite widely 
evaluated compared with the impact of tax incentives 
on other LCTs. Sierzchula et al. (2014) found that 
EFIs (reductions to registration taxes and annual car 
tax) were positively correlated with a country’s electric 
vehicle market share in the 30 countries examined, 
while two studies found that the strong tax incentives 
introduced in the Netherlands and Ireland were highly 
effective in promoting purchasing behaviour towards 
lower carbon dioxide (CO2)-emitting vehicles (Rogan 
et al., 2011; Kok, 2015).
As with grants, few of the studies provided 
comprehensive ex post assessments of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the instrument, and assessments 
of cost-effectiveness were somewhat uncommon. 
Where cost-effectiveness is considered, results 
are mixed. While Black et al. (2014) concluded 
that sales and tax rebate programmes had positive 
revenue effects without considering the additional 
wider positive economic impacts in society, other 
studies have identified cost-effectiveness concerns. 
Kok (2015) and Rogan et al. (2011) found that a 
rapid fall in government revenue resulted from the 
introduction of tax incentives for low-carbon vehicles, 
although the wider societal costs and benefits were 
not evaluated in these studies. Roulleau and Lloyd 
(2008) found that French income tax rebates resulted 
in significant capital cost increases, which may have 
been attributable to the fact that the magnitude of the 
tax credit depended on the cost of the technology. 
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Considering the wide usage of tax incentives globally, 
the absence of comprehensive cost-effectiveness 
evaluations in the academic literature is notable.
Stop–start investment cycles were identified as an 
issue with tax incentives in the case of some schemes, 
highlighting the importance of long-term policy signals 
and programmes. For example, Roulleau and Lloyd 
(2008) found that policy changes resulted in market 
uncertainty in the case of the Greek scheme, and 
Solangi et al. (2011) found that an income tax credit for 
solar PV in the USA was subject to continuous political 
uncertainty, which undermined its effectiveness.
Other studies focused on the importance of the 
design characteristics of tax incentives to improve 
effectiveness and their attractiveness to local citizens. 
Kok (2015) identified the “salience” of the tax (the 
visibility, transparency and attention drawn to tax 
incentives) as an important success factor, while Yin 
(2012) found that neither a production tax credit nor an 
Oregon business energy tax had been designed with 
communities in mind and were not therefore conducive 
to community investment. These findings again 
highlight the importance of designing EFIs with local 
citizens in mind (section 3.2).
There are also a number of studies that compare tax 
incentives with other EFIs. Compared with grants, 
tax incentives have the disadvantage of not generally 
addressing the upfront investment costs barrier. Both 
Cansino et al. (2011) and Kok (2015) concluded that 
the upfront nature of tax incentives is an important 
design consideration, while Roulleau and Lloyd (2008) 
found that the ex post reimbursement of investors 
(who received compensation when tax returns were 
filed) may have undermined the effectiveness of the 
programme.
As with grants and FiTs, the importance of wider 
context-specific considerations was identified as an 
important consideration by Sierzchula et al. (2014), 
who concluded that tax incentives alone are important 
but not sufficient to guarantee high technology 
adoption rates. Finally, the overall impact of tax 
incentives on social acceptability of technology is not 
widely discussed in the literature. It should be noted, 
however, that tax incentives necessarily target tax 
payers and, in some cases, provide a higher level 
of relief to wealthier cohorts in society. The equity 
implications of a Greek tax incentive programme are 
questioned on this basis (Roulleau and Lloyd, 2008).
2.7 Soft Loans
A loan is “soft” when the rate of interest charged on 
the loan is lower than the commercial rate charged by 
banks and other financing institutions for commercial 
loans (Chandrasekar and Kandpal, 2005). Loans are 
a common LCT financing instrument, particularly in 
Germany, where their use is important. Soft loans are 
often provided by commercial banks supported by the 
government; however, governmental organisations can 
also act as lenders (Bobinaite and Tarvydas, 2014).
There is mixed evidence on the effectiveness of soft 
loans as a stand-alone EFI, based on limited evidence 
and few studies. Zhao et al. (2012) found that 
homeowners were attracted to financial incentives, but 
that they valued tax credits much more than interest-
free loans when it came to investing in LCTs, in part 
because local citizens were debt averse (Zhao et al., 
2012). Similarly, Chandrasekar and Kandpal (2005) 
found that an interest subsidy scheme provided for 
selected LCTs by the Indian Government was not 
as attractive as an income tax benefit. According to 
Roulleau and Lloyd (2008), New Zealand introduced 
an interest-free loan for SWH appliances in 1978, 
covering 60% of cost, although the scheme was 
not found to be attractive to consumers and was 
discontinued as a result of low take-up. Under the 
UK Green Deal scheme, loans were made available 
to homeowners to promote building retrofitting. 
Marchant et al. (2015) found that, while the concept 
was appealing, the cost of finance on offer (8–10%) 
was one of the key barriers to uptake. This finding 
was supported by ex ante studies, which predicted 
that uptake would be low unless much lower interest 
rates could be offered (Dowson et al., 2012; Hough 
and White, 2014). It should be noted, however, that 
it is questionable whether or not the loan could be 
considered “soft” in this case, and factors such as 
limited awareness of the programme and upfront cost 
barriers were also identified as problematic.
In many cases, however, a soft loan may be 
combined with another financial incentive to make 
it more attractive as an EFI (Cansino et al., 2010, 
2011). Perhaps the most important example of soft 
loans is those provided by the German state-owned 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) Bank. Strupeit 
and Palm (2016) and Yildiz (2014) found that while tax 
incentives and FiTs had been a central element to the 
German offering, the availability of low-interest loans, 
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provided by KfW and issued through local banks, was 
an important success factor in the deployment of solar 
PV in Germany (Strupeit and Palm, 2016). Overall, 
there are few assessments of the effectiveness of 
soft loan programmes and fewer still that evaluate 
soft loans as a stand-alone EFI. Their attractiveness 
and effectiveness in mobilising local citizen investors 
therefore emerges as another opportunity for further 
research.
2.8 Conclusion and Policy 
Implications
Our review suggests that, while some individual 
citizens may respond to EFIs in an “economically 
rational” manner, this will not always be the case. 
Considering the behavioural, social, institutional 
and regulatory barriers to investment faced by local 
citizens can therefore enhance the effectiveness of 
policy interventions.
We found that FiTs, quotas, grants and tax incentives 
can be successful in mobilising greater levels of 
investment from local citizens, but that soft loans 
tend to be less effective as a stand-alone instrument. 
Our review also identified potential disadvantages of 
using these instruments, which need to be considered 
carefully, including cost-effectiveness and social equity 
concerns. However, we identified approaches to 
mitigating these downsides through instrument choice 
and design. Overall, we find that there is a need to 
come to a greater understanding of the costs, benefits 
and distributional impacts for society of mobilising 
local citizens as investors using EFIs and for potential 
downsides to be carefully monitored so that social 
legitimacy is enhanced and not undermined.
Our findings highlight the importance of understanding 
and responding to the specific needs of local citizens 
in EFI design. There may often be a requirement to 
include specific design features in FiTs, quotas, grants 
and tax incentives that will cater to the specific needs 
of this cohort. Providing regulatory stability and policy 
certainty emerges as an important success factor, 
as is understanding the characteristics of the target 
demographic and indeed the characteristics of the 
LCT in question. If these factors are not considered 
in policy design, an EFI may not have the desired 
or predicted impact. Our findings also highlight the 
importance of introducing EFIs as part of policy 
packages (Michelsen and Madlener, 2016), where 
complementary measures can address non-financial 
barriers, such as lack of familiarity with the technology, 
technology immaturity and low awareness of the 
incentive programme itself.
Many studies also highlight the importance of 
context-specific considerations (Dewald and Truffer, 
2011; Romero-Rubio and de Andrés Díaz, 2015). We 
therefore concur with Delmas and Montes-Sancho 
(2011) that understanding the natural, social, policy 
and regulatory context under which economic 
incentives operate is necessary to measure success. 
Overall, EFIs targeting local citizens that are carefully 
designed emerge as a potentially important means 
of mobilising private finance in LCTs. This in turn can 
engender greater levels of societal support for low-
carbon transition and contribute to addressing climate 
change.
It should be noted that, given the narrow focus on 
technology-specific and downstream incentives in 
several places, the literature is sparse. Furthermore, 
a key weakness we identified in the literature is that 
studies tend not to systematically and consistently 
evaluate the impact of EFIs. The vast majority of 
studies did not systematically assess policy success 
using the IPCC evaluation criteria. Other complicating 
factors relate to context specificity (Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho, 2011), the use of instruments in 
combination with other measures (Cansino et al., 
2010) and co-benefits and negative spillovers from 
policy interventions that are difficult to consider within 
a single analytical framework (Somanathan et al., 
2014).
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2  While Ontario, unlike the other cases, is a state, and therefore guided by the Federal Government in its energy policies to some 
extent, electricity generation is primarily governed at the provincial level (Krupa et al., 2015).
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present four international case 
studies exploring the experiences of Denmark, 
Germany, the UK and the Canadian state of Ontario.2 
In so doing we introduce an additional element into 
our research. In each case, we explore not only the 
use of financial incentives, but also the relationship 
between the use of financial incentives and the types 
of innovative business models that have emerged as 
vehicles for local citizen investors.
There is a wide-ranging literature that deals with 
business model innovation relevant to the mobilisation 
of citizen investment, which emerged as an important 
theme in our research. The key insight from this 
literature is that new technologies will not achieve 
widespread adoption unless they are commercialised 
via business models (Chesbrough, 2010). The 
traditional energy utility business model has revolved 
around the bulk generation of electricity in centralised 
plants and selling output to customers on a per unit 
basis, often combined with horizontally integrated 
transmission and distribution networks (Richter, 2013). 
The widespread deployment of distributed generation 
technologies is potentially disruptive for this model 
(Johnson and Suskewicz, 2009; Engelken et al., 
2016) and has prompted a focus on business model 
innovation within the sector (Schoettl and Lehmann-
Ortega, 2011; Richter, 2013).
However, there are many barriers to innovation 
(Engelken et al., 2016), and it remains to be seen 
if and how the traditional utility model can evolve in 
response to these pressures (Richter, 2013). Within 
this context there are openings for new actors and for 
business model innovation from outside the traditional 
energy sector. The emergence of new and replicable 
business models has the potential to spur on the 
transformation of the energy sectors (Hellström et al., 
2015). The link between financial incentives and the 
typical business models has been identified in some 
studies (Bolinger, 2001; Regen SW, 2015), but has 
received little analytical attention.
Within the context of the importance of business 
models, in this chapter we look at the relationship 
between financial incentives and business models 
in four jurisdictions. The following section provides 
a justification for our choice of cases. We proceed 
to present the results of each of the four cases 
individually, covering:
 ● a short historical overview of the importance of 
LCTs in the power generation mix, highlighting the 
participation of local citizen investors;
 ● an assessment of the use of financial incentives at 
early (feasibility and development) and late (con-
struction and operation) stages (SEAI, 2016a); and
 ● an evaluation of “typical” business models that 
have emerged as vehicles for local citizens.
In the following discussion section, we “generalise 
patterns across cases” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 540), 
focusing on the comparative use of financial incentives 
and evaluating the connection between the use of 
these instruments and the emergence of typical 
models. A conclusions section follows.
3.2 The Choice of Cases
We have chosen Denmark, Germany, the UK and 
the Canadian state of Ontario as our cases based 
on a number of criteria. First, in all cases, financial 
incentives have successfully been introduced 
to promote deployment of wind and solar PV 
technologies. Second, these incentives have 
specifically targeted local citizen investors in all cases. 
Third, it is recommended that selected cases illustrate 
a difference in a particular phenomenon by comparing 
instances in which it occurs with instances where it 
does not (Odell, 2001). For this reason, we selected 
Denmark and Germany because mobilising local 
citizen investors had been a key feature of low-carbon 
transition in these countries for several decades. By 
contrast, the use of financial incentives targeting local 
citizens is a more recent occurrence in the UK and 
Ontario. The choice of cases therefore allowed us to 
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explore the role of financial incentives within different 
contexts and to compare the differences between 
countries, but also intertemporally within countries. 
Key data from each case study are summarised in 
Table 3.1.
3.3 Denmark
3.3.1 Investments from local citizens
Denmark is a pioneer in the development of wind 
energy technologies (Ratinen and Lund, 2015) and, 
like Germany, is also a leader in the deployment of 
wind energy supported by local citizens. In 2014, 
over half of Denmark’s electricity was generated from 
renewables, with wind accounting for 40% of total 
generation (Table 3.1). Of total wind generation, 40% 
is from offshore turbines (Energienet, 2015).
Local citizen ownership has been a key aspect of 
the Danish model. Several thousand wind energy 
guilds existed as early as 1990. These were often 
small projects owned by farmers, private households 
or local companies (Oteman et al., 2014). By 2001, 
150,000 households owned or held shares in wind 
projects (Walker, 2008). In 2015, small private wind 
energy operators were responsible for 50% of the total 
electricity market share (Vindenergi Danmark, 2015).
3.1.2	 The	use	of	financial	incentives
The development of renewable energy in Denmark 
gained impetus following the energy crises of 
the 1970s. High energy taxes were introduced 
(supplemented by carbon taxes since 1992) to 
promote energy efficiency, creating an early incentive 
to explore alternatives to fossil fuels (Nachmany et al., 
2014).
In 1979, a grant covering 30% of the purchase price 
of a wind turbine was introduced. As wind power 
economics improved during the 1980s, the investment 
subsidy was gradually reduced before being eliminated 
in 1989 after a total government investment of €38 
million (Meyer, 2003). While early producers received 
a price for their electricity relative to retail rates, 
the grant proved attractive to local citizen investors 
(Oteman et al., 2014), who were responsible for all 
early investment. In this period, the income from wind 
farms received favourable tax treatment: interest on 
loans for purchase of shares in a wind turbine was tax 
deductible and businesses could depreciate the value 
of a wind turbine by up to 30% annually (Bolinger, 
2001).
A fixed FiT was introduced by the Danish government 
in 1993 (IRENA, 2012). This was combined with a 
tax refund for income from wind power generation 
for individuals who participated in wind energy 
co-operatives, introduced in 1997 (IEA, 2016). 
Together these incentives delivered strong growth in 
wind capacity through the remaining part of the 1990s 
(Meyer, 2007). Furthermore, grants were available 
from the Danish Energy Agency to cover feasibility 
assessments (Middelgrunden Cooperative, 2000). By 
2002, wind already accounted for 15% of the country’s 
electricity generation, and 40% of installations were 
run by local wind energy guilds (Gotchev, 2015). 
Income from shares in wind farms remained tax 
deductible up to a certain limit. In these early years, 
projects were smaller and easier to finance, not least 
because of the presence of “ethical” banks such as 
Table 3.1. Key case study data
Proportion of electricity generation (%, 2014) Local ownership
Renewables Wind Solar PV Other
Denmark 53 40.5 0.2 12.3 Over half of total investment in wind technologies 
from local citizen investors
Germany 25.8 9 5.0 11.8 Over half of total investment in wind and solar PV 
technologies from local citizen investors
UK 19.1 9.5 0.6 9 Low initial level of local citizen investment, growing 
gradually from 2000 and more rapidly between 
2009 and 2015
Ontario 28.7 4.4 < 0.1 24.3 Low levels of community and citizen ownership, 
growing rapidly from 2009
Sources: Danish Energy Agency, 2014; DECC, 2015b; IESO, 2015a; BMWi, 2016; Energienet DK, 2016.
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Fælleskassen providing loans for wind turbines at 
below-market rates (Bolinger, 2001).
The intention to move to a more market-orientated 
support scheme was flagged in the Electricity Reform 
Act (2001), and a FiP was eventually introduced in 
2003. These developments resulted in slow-down in 
investment. In 2009, investment in wind energy began 
to recover. This has been attributed to an increase in 
the premium available to wind energy producers and 
the reforms introduced in the Promotion of Renewable 
Energy Sources Act (2008). This Act introduced a 
number of initiatives to promote local acceptance and 
participation, which was deemed necessary, given 
increased local objections to wind developments, 
as well as the progression towards larger and more 
complex wind turbines (Danish Energy Agency, 
2012; Oteman et al., 2014). The Act required project 
developers to offer at least 20% of the ownership 
shares for sale to the local population within 4.5 km of 
developments. It also introduced a specific measure to 
mitigate early-stage project risks for citizen investors 
in the form of loans to local groups covering project 
feasibility studies, up to a maximum of approximately 
€70,000 (Figure 3.1). In addition to the state 
guarantee, local citizens tend to have access to project 
finance, generally from commercial banks, as projects 
have an established track record and are considered 
low risk (A. Bjerre, Danmarks Vindmølleforening, 11 
April 2016, personal communication).
3.3.3 Business models for citizen investors
Danish community wind projects tend to take the form 
of guilds. In 2009, approximately 15% of Danish wind 
energy projects were owned by guilds (Danmarks 
Vindmølleforening, 2009). These are profit-orientated 
partnership structures that take decisions in a similar 
way to co-operatives (one member, one vote). 
Partners have joint and several liability, but risks are 
reduced for investors by bylaws precluding partnership 
as they cannot contract debt and require wind 
turbines to be adequately insured (Tranaes, 1996). 
Finance is raised through the issuance of shares, 
with one share generally corresponding to an annual 
production of 1000 kWh (Danmarks Vindmølleforening, 
2009). There is generally a limit to the number of 
shares that an individual can purchase (A. Bjerre, 
Danmarks Vindmølleforening, 11 April 2016, personal 
communication) and “criteria of residence” require that 
members of a guild live within a certain proximity. Even 
though guilds are often confused with co-operatives, 
they are legally distinct. Co-operatives are very 
common in Denmark, but the great majority are active 
in the biomass district heating sector and are operated 
as not-for-profit organisations (REScoop, 2016). While 
a limited number of wind co-operatives exist, these 
are less common than the for-profit guild structure (P. 
Maegaard, 20 April 2016, personal communication).
The increased scale, turbine size and investment 
requirements of wind projects over the past decade, 
1980s
1990s
2000s
2010s
FiT
Income tax rebate
FiP
Income tax rebate
Grants for turbines
Mandate equity offer
to local citizens
Guarantee scheme
for loans
DevelopmentFeasibility OperationConstruction
Increased FiP
Favourable tax
treatment
Timeline Project Stage
Danish Energy
Agency grants
Soft loans from 
ethical banks
Figure 3.1. Danish incentives over time and project stage.
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as well as the subsequent introduction of the 
co-ownership requirement in 2009, resulted in the 
emergence of a growing number of partnerships 
between community guilds and professional 
developers such as energy utilities (Gotchev, 2015). 
These projects are generally led by professional 
developers who take on early-stage project risk, 
while guilds are offered an opportunity to invest 
before the construction phase. These partnerships 
therefore help community groups overcome early-
stage project risks and the difficulties associated 
with raising large amounts of finance (A. Bjerre, 
Danmarks Vindmølleforening, 11 April 2016, personal 
communication). The Middelgrunden Offshore Wind 
Farm (40 MW), for example, was developed through 
a partnership between the local municipality energy 
company and 8000 local citizen investors organised 
into a guild (Danmarks Vindmølleforening, 2009). In 
this case, the utility guaranteed the project if all shares 
were not sold (Middelgrunden Cooperative, 2000), but 
a limited partnership structure was maintained with 
joint and several liability for all guild members. While 
there are examples of project developers that promote 
citizen participation without guilds, the majority of new 
onshore projects involve partnerships between local 
citizen guilds and professional developers. Guilds have 
therefore continued to thrive in an era of increasingly 
industrialised wind energy development (A. Bjerre, 
Danmarks Vindmølleforening, 11 April 2016, personal 
communication).
3.4 Germany
3.4.1 Investments from local citizens
Germany is a pioneer in the deployment of distributed 
renewable energy technologies for electricity 
generation and in the involvement of local citizens as 
investors in low-carbon transition. In 2014, nearly 26% 
of Germany’s electricity was generated by renewables, 
with wind and solar PV accounting for over 9% and 5% 
of this total, respectively (Table 3.1). Citizen-led energy 
initiatives are a cornerstone of the German energy 
transition. Almost 46% of all investment across wind, 
solar and other renewables has come from individual 
and community groups (Trend Research, 2013). Of 
total citizen investments, 54% comes from individuals, 
26% from shareholdings in renewable projects and 
20% from co-operatives (Trend Research, 2013). 
Collective citizen ownership of renewable energy 
technologies is particularly widespread in the area of 
onshore wind power and solar PV, as well as biomass 
technologies.
3.4.2	 The	use	of	financial	incentives
Public concern around nuclear power spurred the 
German government to introduce research and 
development (R&D) policy supports to promote 
renewables in the late 1970s. However, by the end of 
the 1980s, Germany’s electricity supply system was 
dominated by very large utilities that relied on coal and 
nuclear generation (IRENA, 2012). The appearance of 
climate change as a concern and the 1986 Chernobyl 
nuclear accident acted as catalysts for change.
Following a pilot programme that provided grants for 
wind power deployment in 1989, the first Electricity 
Feed-in Act (1990) introduced a FiT for renewable 
electricity. The Act made it obligatory for utilities to 
connect new independent power producers to the grid, 
thereby reducing the risk that FiT-approved projects 
would not achieve grid connection and de-risking the 
early-stage investments. Subsequent incentives have, 
to a greater extent, focused on the construction and 
operation phases of project development.
The introduction of the FiT is widely considered to 
have been a turning point for both the deployment of 
wind power and the role of local citizen investors in 
Germany’s electricity market (Jacobsson and Lauber, 
2006; IRENA, 2012). By offering an undifferentiated 
FiT, in practice, onshore wind power, which is the most 
cost-effective renewable energy source, was favoured. 
Additional supports for wind power included loans 
at preferential rates and significant tax advantages. 
For example, citizen investors in German wind 
partnerships could aggressively write off depreciation 
against all forms of income, including wage income, 
until the late 1990s (Bolinger, 2001). As a result of 
these incentives, early investors were mainly small 
independent power producers, including individual 
citizens and collectively owned projects (Bolinger, 
2001; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006).
While the first FiT was not financially attractive for solar 
PV investments, some utilities began to offer local 
supports for PV (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). More 
significantly, the “1000 Solar Roofs Initiative”, a grant 
programme launched in 1991, provided up to 70% 
of the upfront costs for these installations. This grant 
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programme was followed in 1999 with the “100,000 
Solar Roofs Initiative”, under which the German 
state-owned development bank (KfW) offered loans to 
individuals and small companies at low interest rates 
(under 2%), covering the full cost of projects, with the 
objective of delivering 300 MW of installed capacity 
(Weiss and Sprau, 2002). These soft loan programmes 
were expanded to cover all renewable projects, with 
finance covering both development and construction 
costs (IEA-RETD, 2016).
While the number of applications for preferential loans 
programmes was initially low, this changed when the 
Renewable Energy Act (2000/305) came into being: it 
introduced a FiT regime that differentiated according 
to technology type and project size, and included a 
much more attractive tariff for solar PV projects (Figure 
3.2). The Act has undergone four amendments (in 
2004, 2009, 2012 and 2014). Several studies point to 
the combined impact of the FiT and the widespread 
availability of soft loans that cover development and 
construction costs as key success factors in the 
German case (Yildiz, 2014; IEA-RETD, 2016; Strupeit 
and Palm, 2016).
A number of reforms to the incentive programmes 
have been introduced in the past 5 years, with the 
objective of transitioning towards more market-based 
3  Under this approach, generators sell energy into the market; to reduce exposure to changing electricity prices, the price is a 
variable top-up from the market price instead of pre-agreed. At times where the market price exceeds the strike price, the generator 
is required to pay back the difference.
support mechanisms. These have included significant 
cutbacks in the FiT levels for new projects (2012 and 
2014) and replacing the FiT with an optional (2012) 
and then mandatory (2014) FiP for new projects based 
on a contracts for difference3 approach. As of 2017, 
the FiT will be replaced by a competitive bidding 
model (tenders) for larger projects. These changes 
have created challenges for smaller independent 
producers (Wassermann et al., 2015; Bauwens et 
al., 2016). None of the successful bids for the federal 
government’s first solar park tender for 157 MW came 
from individuals or smaller independent producers, 
suggesting that the new scheme may have created 
barriers to entry for these actors (IEA-RETD, 2016).
Finally, a proliferation of regional and local-level 
advisory services and citizens groups provided 
expertise and management services, often on an 
unpaid basis, to community projects (Schreuer, 2015). 
Indeed, regional clusters of community energy projects 
are located in places where support services are 
offered (Holstenkamp and Müller, 2013).
3.4.3 Business models for citizen investors
Two typical business models have emerged in 
Germany as vehicles for citizen investors. The first is 
Figure 3.2. German incentives over time and project stage.
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a GmbH & Co. KG4 structure (Bolinger, 2001; Yildiz, 
2014), which is the preferred model for the majority 
of collectively owned wind farms. This is a developer-
led model in which the developer incorporates the 
business as a limited liability company (GmbH). The 
developer is the project manager, responsible for 
entrepreneurial and operational decisions. For each 
project undertaken, a private limited partnership (KG) 
is created, under which large numbers (up to 15,000) 
of individual project partners are brought in as equity 
investors (Bolinger, 2001). It should be noted that 
investment opportunities are widely advertised and 
that not all investment comes from the local area 
(Schreuer, 2015). The limited partners are consulted 
only with respect to fundamental company decisions, 
and minimum and maximum levels for shareholdings 
are often set to avoid domination by large investors 
(Yildiz, 2014).
The second popular model is the community-led 
co-operative structure, which is a particularly important 
vehicle for collective solar PV projects. Cooperatives 
are often explicitly linked to political goals of 
democratisation and empowerment through the ‘one 
member, one vote’ rule, and are therefore balanced 
between achieving economic benefits and taking social 
responsibility (Schreuer, 2010; Debor, 2014). As of 
2014, there were 484 solar PV co-operatives and 114 
wind co-operatives. These can generally be classified 
as small to medium-sized organisations (the majority 
have under 200 members who are shareholders). The 
growth of co-operatives has, however, slowed since 
2014, when only 29 co-operatives were established 
in total (Müller, 2015). While solar PV cooperatives 
remain dominant, the increase in wind co-operatives 
has been notable in recent times, perhaps resulting 
from changes to the FiT for solar PV (Debor, 2014; 
Müller, 2015), but also pointing to the fact that 
co-operatives were willing to consider more capital-
intensive investment opportunities (Debor, 2014). 
Finally, four German crowdfunding platforms have 
emerged, which focus on raising funding for energy 
co-operatives. While these do not target citizens in a 
particular locality, they offer the opportunity to further 
democratise the energy transition by offering an entry 
4  The GmbH & Co. KG is a limited partnership in which, typically, the sole general partner is a limited liability company. It can thus 
combine the advantages of a partnership with those of the limited liability of a corporation.
5  The UK consists of the following four countries: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. While overall energy policy is 
co-ordinated centrally, each country has considerable autonomy in energy policy development and in the introduction of financial 
incentives.
point for investors with low levels of access to capital 
(Borchert, 2015).
3.5 The UK
3.5.1 Investments from local citizens
In contrast to Denmark and Germany, the UK has 
been a relatively late adopter of distributed renewable 
energy technologies such as solar PV and wind. 
In total, 19% of electricity was generated from 
renewables in 2014. Of this total, 9% came from 
wind and less than 1% from solar PV (Table 3.1). In 
1990, there was virtually no locally owned renewable 
energy generation (Breukers and Wolsink, 2007). 
Since the year 2000, however, there has been an 
increase in local citizen investment (Bolinger, 2005; 
Toke et al., 2008). By 2013 the level of community 
renewable electricity capacity installed had risen to 
66 MW, with another 200 MW in development, 85% 
of which was accounted for by wind and 14% by 
solar PV (Carpenter, 2014). A number of partnership 
projects between community groups and professional 
project developers were also in development or had 
been completed (DECC, 2015c). While the role of 
local citizen investors therefore remains marginal, it is 
growing fast.
3.5.2	 The	use	of	financial	incentives
Renewable energy deployment in the UK5 traditionally 
focused on large-scale, utility and private sector-driven 
wind power applications (Breukers and Wolsink, 
2007; Walker et al., 2007). The early liberalisation 
of the UK energy sector (in 1989) was followed by 
the introduction of the Non-fossil Fuel Obligation, 
introduced in the Electricity Act of 1989, which required 
electricity distribution operators to purchase a specified 
amount of non-fossil fuel energy from suppliers. 
Contracts were awarded to the lowest cost projects 
following a competitive tendering process, thereby 
favouring large companies with strong financial 
backing. The administrative burden of participating 
in the scheme and the absence of tax incentives 
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and capital investment subsidies at that time further 
undermined its attractiveness for local citizens 
(Bolinger, 2005; Breukers and Wolsink, 2007).
A Renewables Obligation (RO) (Utilities Act, 2000) 
scheme followed in 2002, which required electricity 
suppliers in England and Wales to supply an 
increasing portion of electricity from renewables. 
This scheme was equally unattractive to community 
groups because of the higher costs associated 
with the smaller scale projects that they tended 
to propose (Breukers and Wolsink, 2007). Other 
barriers to community group participation included 
the complexity of the application process and the 
perceived higher risk (Saunders et al., 2012). While 
the RO itself was phased out in 2016 and replaced 
with a contract for difference support schemes (DECC, 
2015d), community groups have identified a number 
of concerns with the latest scheme, including the high 
administrative and upfront costs, tight timelines and 
penalties for contract withdrawal (DECC, 2015a).
The beginning of the new millennium is often cited as 
a turning point with respect to local and community 
engagement in renewable energy projects (Bolinger, 
2005; Walker et al., 2007; Toke et al., 2008). The 
change in direction came in part as a response to 
planning and permitting difficulties experienced by 
larger commercial wind projects. Giving the local 
community a financial stake in the success of a project 
came to be seen as a way to bolster community 
support (Bolinger, 2005; Walker et al., 2007; Toke et 
al., 2008; DECC, 2014), but also as a way of educating 
the public (Walker et al., 2007).
During this period, a number of pilot programmes were 
launched, which focused on providing grant support 
to exemplar community energy projects along with 
earlier stage advice and support, including the 5-year 
Community Renewables Initiative, launched in 2002 
(Walker, 2008). This was followed by the Low Carbon 
Communities Challenge in 2009, under which advice 
and support on project development was provided and 
grant support was made available to cover investment 
costs for 20 “test-bed” community projects across 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland (DECC, 2012). 
At local and regional level, national programmes were 
supplemented with grants.
Many UK community energy groups were initially able 
to take advantage of grants, but they found a stable 
supply of funding to be important to operate effectively 
in the longer term (Saunders et al., 2012; Seyfang 
et al., 2013). A major turning point in supporting 
local community energy projects was reached 
with the introduction of technology- and project 
size-differentiated FiTs in the Energy Act (2008/21) 
(DECC, 2014), which entered into effect in 2010. 
Payments through the mechanism replaced the RO for 
small-scale projects (5 MW, raised to 10 MW in 2015) 
(DECC, 2015a). In general, FiTs cannot be combined 
with grant programmes, although some exceptions 
have been made (DECC, 2015a).
The rates of tariffs available under the programme 
have been subject to considerable uncertainty, as 
cuts were announced on several occasions, including 
in the first year of the scheme (DECC, 2011) and 
in December 2015, along with a more stringent 
degression mechanism (OFGEM, 2016). These have 
been justified on the basis of high take-up and the 
declining cost of installation and hardware, especially 
for solar PV (DECC, 2014). However, community 
groups have complained that the cuts themselves 
have damaged confidence in the community energy 
sector (Quantum, 2015).
FiTs, however, were not found to overcome all 
hurdles faced by community energy projects (Nolden, 
2013; Bauwens et al., 2016). Particular challenges 
in raising early-stage finance from the private sector 
were identified due to the weak balance sheets of 
community groups (DECC, 2014). A grant of up to 
approximately €26,000 was therefore made available 
for feasibility assessments as well as a non-recourse 
loan of up to €167,000 for pre-planning development 
work (DECC, 2014). Similar schemes have been 
introduced by the Scottish and Welsh administrations 
(DECC, 2015a).
A number of tax advantages were also available 
for community investors (Figure 3.3). This included 
schemes to provide up to 30% tax relief to investors 
in new companies, early-stage start-ups and social 
enterprises. In 2015, however, the UK Treasury 
announced that community energy projects benefiting 
from subsidies would be excluded from these schemes 
(CEE, 2015). According to community groups, these 
changes will negatively affect the business case for 
projects. Challenges notwithstanding, the package of 
incentives, and the FiT in particular, has proven itself 
popular among community groups and has driven the 
expansion of this sector (CEC, 2015).
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Finally, there has been a growing emphasis on 
encouraging communities and industries to work 
together on schemes of mutual interest (DECC, 
2015c). To this end, a voluntary approach was trialled 
in which developers offered between 5% and 25% 
of shares to local communities in cases where the 
project size exceeded €3.2 million (DECC, 2015c). 
The UK government has legislated to create reserve 
powers within the Infrastructure Act (2015/7), which, 
if exercised, would make this voluntary approach 
mandatory.
3.5.3 Business models for citizen investors
While in the cases of Denmark and Germany a 
number of typical structures can be identified, the 
legal forms taken by collective local energy projects 
in the UK are quite diverse (Rijpens et al., 2013). 
Local citizen investment can take one of several legal 
forms that are recognised under FiT guidance (DECC, 
2015a).
While there are fewer co-operatives in the UK 
compared with other European countries (Bolinger, 
2001), they are increasing in popularity. In 2013, the 
most popular options for community energy projects 
was either co-operatives or community benefit 
societies, which accounted for 90 projects (Carpenter, 
2014). These legal forms were introduced under the 
Cooperative and Community Benefit Societies Act 
(2014/14) (Regen SW, 2015). Both can raise capital 
from the public through community shares issues and 
are exempt from some aspects of financial regulations. 
The key difference is that co-operatives are run for the 
benefit of members in a for-profit manner, whereas 
community benefit societies are projects that aim to 
benefit the community (Carpenter, 2014; DECC, 2014). 
Charities are another popular vehicle for renewable 
energy project developers, with some 50 projects 
having taken this legal form in 2013 (Carpenter, 
2014). A less popular legal form than charities is the 
community interest company, which is limited by 
guarantee or shares. This form is designed for social 
enterprises that want to use their profits and assets 
for the public good; profits are therefore locked and 
cannot be distributed to shareholders. However, unlike 
charities, their directors can be paid a salary.
As with Denmark, another recent trend is towards 
shared ownership models led by professional 
developers, rather than towards fully locally owned 
projects. As of the end of 2015, there were five 
schemes in England and a further 12 schemes in 
Scotland with some form of community or individual 
investment, with the community investment taking 
a variety of forms, including joint ventures between 
community groups and project developers (DECC, 
2015c; Strachan et al., 2015). These partnerships 
may have potential for “replicating and up-scaling” 
community ownership (Strachan et al., 2015, p. 103). 
There are also several examples of community groups 
applying for loans and individuals buying debentures in 
a project through, for example, a regulated investment 
platform. This type of investment vehicle can enable 
Figure 3.3. UK incentives over time and project stage.
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very low levels of investment, making schemes highly 
accessible to the broader community (DECC, 2015c).
3.6 Ontario, Canada
3.6.1 Investments from local citizens
The Canadian state of Ontario has been a relative 
latecomer to deploying wind and solar PV energy, but 
it has sought to mobilise local citizens as investors as 
a central dimension of its transition to a low-carbon 
economy. Whereas in 2006 virtually no wind or solar 
PV electricity was generated, by 2014, renewables 
accounted for 24% of electricity generated, with over 
4% coming from wind and under 1% from solar PV 
(Table 3.1).
Between 2010 and 2015, 4627 MW of renewable 
contracts were awarded by the Independent 
Electricity System Operator (IESO). Community equity 
participation has been a central feature, with some 
form of community and/or Aboriginal (First Nation and 
Métis) participation in 22% of total contracts issued 
(IESO, 2015b).6 Furthermore, an additional 20,000 
micro-FiT contracts have been issued for small solar 
PV installations, representing 181 MW of capacity 
(IESO, 2015b), which included applications from many 
farmers, business owners and homeowners. Some 
community groups pursued their first projects as a 
result of the micro-FiT programme by aggregating a 
number of these contracts (Lipp et al., 2016).
3.6.2	 The	use	of	financial	incentives
The Renewable Energy Standard Offer Program 
(2006) introduced a FiT for renewable energy 
in Canada. This programme encouraged a high 
concentration of larger developers because of the high 
cost of applications, among other factors. This was 
followed by the Green Energy and Green Economy 
Act (2009/12), which introduced a technology-
differentiated FiT, offering stable prices and long-term 
contracts. Compared with the Renewable Energy 
Standard Offer Program, the price schedule for the 
FIT offered a considerably more attractive return for 
investors.
The new programme was divided into two streams: the 
FIT stream and the micro-FiT stream. The micro-FiT 
6 This includes a small number of hydro and biomass projects.
programme – for projects not exceeding 10 kW – 
focused on homeowners and small businesses. It 
also introduced a streamlined application and contract 
issuance procedures. Ontario’s FiT policy has been 
compared to the German FiT scheme. It comprises a 
set of prices for multiple technologies, differentiated 
according to project size. In both cases, as the project 
size decreases, the tariff increases (Mabee et al., 
2012; Stokes, 2013), although the German scheme 
has a greater number of options (Mabee et al., 2012).
A distinctive design feature of the 2009 FiT was 
the strong additional incentives and supports for 
community-owned projects. There was a particular 
emphasis on promoting projects owned by Aboriginal 
communities, which are an acutely disadvantaged 
minority in Ontario. Aboriginal peoples face even 
greater barriers in participating in renewable projects 
than other community groups (Krupa, 2012a, 2013), 
yet nearly all future electricity developments will occur 
within their territories (Krupa et al., 2015).
The key incentive mechanism was an “adder” to the 
FiT, an additional amount per kilowatt-hour of energy 
produced over standard FIT rates, related to the 
percentage of equity ownership by Aboriginal and 
other community groups (Cameron, 2011). As can be 
seen from Table 3.2, this adder varied by technology 
and was higher for Aboriginal groups than for other 
local community groups. In addition to the adder, 
Aboriginal groups in Canada are exempt from taxation 
for many activities (J. Krupa, University of Toronto, 14 
April 2014, personal communication).
A 2011 review of the programme found that the FiT 
rules using a “first come, first served” approach 
disadvantaged community and Aboriginal participation, 
because these project types tended to take more time 
to organise and were more challenging to finance 
(IESO, 2012). Subsequently, under the second phase 
of the FiT, commercial projects with equity participation 
of 15% from local or Aboriginal communities received 
additional points on their application. Furthermore, 
25 MW of the FiT was set aside for projects that had 
50% equity ownership from co-operatives (this legal 
form was given specific recognition) and a further 
25 MW was set aside for projects with 50% equity 
ownership from Aboriginal groups (Lipp et al., 2016). 
Further to these requirements, a significant number 
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of FiT contracts were issued involving community 
participation and a majority of co-operatives active in 
the renewable sector were established in response to 
FiT 2 (People Power Planet, 2016).
In 2013, as a result of concerns around the cost to 
the exchequer (Krupa et al., 2015), it was announced 
that “large” renewable projects (over 500 kW) would 
be removed from the FiT programme (IESO, 2013). 
A competitive tendering process was introduced for 
these projects. The degree of community engagement 
and ownership, including equity ownership from 
co-operatives, Aboriginal groups, local landowners 
and municipalities were included as important criteria 
in this tendering process. As a result, 13 of the first 
16 projects (five wind, seven solar PV and four 
hydroelectric) contract offers included participation 
from one or more Aboriginal communities, including 
five with more than 50% Aboriginal participation. 
Additionally, 75% of the successful proposals received 
support from local municipalities and more than 
60% had support from abutting landowners. None of 
the projects, however, involved participation from a 
co-operative or a non-Aboriginal community group (C. 
Koenig, Ontario Sustainability Services Inc., 5 April 
2016, personal communication).
Under the FiT for medium-sized projects (10 kW to 
500 kW), which remains in place, 968 applications 
were received, representing a total of 582 MW. Of 
these, 13% had Aboriginal community participation, 
35% had municipal and public sector participation 
and 25% had community participation (IESO, 2016). 
Finally, under the micro-FiT, approximately 50 MW of 
solar PV is to be procured between 2013 and 2017, 
and the majority of this will come from individuals, 
small businesses and some community groups 
(Government of Ontario, 2016).
The FiT, however, was not the only support introduced 
for community projects. A number of incentives were 
made available to address key barriers to community 
participation, such as access to finance to cover 
establishment and early-stage project feasibility 
assessments and planning applications studies (The 
Federation of Community Power Co-ops, 2015). 
These programmes were streamlined into the Energy 
Partnership Program (Figure 3.4), which provides 
grant funding to cover the legal, technical, financial, 
due diligence and soft costs of community energy 
projects supported by the FiT. Charities, not-for-profit 
organisations and co-operatives are eligible for the 
fund and so are projects developed by individual 
Ontario residents, such as farmers. These grants have 
been an important factor in getting community projects 
off the ground (The Federation of Community Power 
Co-ops, 2015).
3.6.3 Business models for citizen investors
Housing co-operatives, farm co-operatives or credit 
unions have a long history in Ontario. A number of 
regulatory changes have ensured that co-operatives 
are a key feature of community participation in 
Ontarian renewable deployment. First, a specifically 
tailored renewable energy co-operative was 
established pursuant to the Green Energy and 
Economy Act (2009/12). This removed the obligation 
for co-operatives to conduct 50% of their business with 
members. Second, since the second stage of the FiT 
regime in 2012, the co-operative has been the sole 
legal form recognised for community energy projects 
(J. Lipp, TREC Renewable Energy Cooperative, 12 
April 2015, personal communication).
It is estimated that 30 to 35 co-operatives are actively 
developing projects, and there have been annual 
Table 3.2. Maximum adder to FiT price schedule (c/kWh)
Source of power Aboriginal groups Other community groups
Wind 1.5 1
Solar PV 1.5 1
Hydro 0.9 0.6
Biogas 0.6 0.4
Biomass 0.6 0.4
Landfill 0.6 0.4
Source: Cameron (2011, p. 12)
c/kWh, cents per kilowatt-hour.
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Figure 3.4. Ontarian incentives over time and project stage.
Grant and access
to finance 
2000s
2010s Differentiated FiT + adder
Tax exemption for
Aboriginal communities
Grant and access
to finance 
FiT contract set aside
Tendering scheme with
local ownership criteria
Timeline
DevelopmentFeasibility OperationConstruction
Box 3.1. Conference on mobilising Irish citizens as investors
Cork University Business School hosted a conference as part of this project on the topic “Financial 
incentives to promote local ownership and investment in low-carbon technologies: identify pressures, 
inform policy and develop solutions”, held in the Spencer Hotel on 8 December 2016. The event was 
attended by some 80 experts and stakeholders from across government, the private sector, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and community groups. Kevin Brady, Head of Strategic Energy Policy 
Division in the Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment, opened the conference. 
Mr Brady outlined the critical importance of engaging citizens in Ireland’s energy transition from the 
government’s perspective, as encapsulated in the Energy White Paper (2014). He detailed the key policy 
initiatives on the horizon, including the design of a new support scheme for renewables in 2017, which will 
be designed with citizen investors in mind.
This was followed by a keynote address by Professor Dr Rolf Wüstenhagen, Good Energies Professor for 
Management of Renewable Energies, University of St Gallen, on the topic “Promoting citizen investment 
in renewable energy technologies: Swiss and German experiences”. Professor Wüstenhagen, who is one 
of the key figures globally on the topic of promoting citizen investment on LCTs, outlined approaches to 
promoting citizen investment and the pitfalls to be avoided, drawing in particular on German and Swiss 
experiences. This was followed by a keynote address by Jennifer Ramsay, Local Energy Scotland, on 
the topic “Financial incentives to mobilise local citizens in Scottish wind projects”. Ms Ramsey outlined 
the successes of the Scottish Government in terms of promoting more citizen participation in wind project 
developments and highlighted the importance of providing trusted advice and expertise to citizens through 
a trusted intermediary as a key success factor.
In the second session, Joseph Curtin and Dr Celine McInerney presented interim project findings. Joseph 
Curtin presented the findings of four country case studies (see Chapter 3), highlighting in particular the 
importance of overcoming discrete barriers to citizen investment at early (feasibility and development) 
stages of developing a renewable energy project. Dr McInerney presented a typology of business models 
for citizen participation (see Chapter 6), focusing on the importance of de-risking projects for citizens and 
the potential for positive forms of financial collaboration between project developers and citizens.
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increases in the number of co-operatives, the project 
volume and the membership recruitment since the 
inception of the FiT in 2009 (Lipp et al., 2016). The 
vast majority of co-operatives are involved in solar PV 
projects and the majority are raising capital through the 
issuance of shares or bonds and are run on a for-profit 
basis (The Federation of Community Power Co-ops, 
2015). Non-profit organisations, such as charities and 
faith-based organisations, have also been active as 
investors in renewables in Ontario, albeit at a smaller 
scale under the micro-FiT programme (People Power 
Planet, 2016).
A key feature of renewables deployment in 
Ontario is participation from Aboriginal peoples. 
Projects tend to be joint ventures or limited liability 
partnerships between a professional developer and 
an Aboriginal group (Krupa, 2012b; Pic River, 2016). 
The co-operative form is not a favoured vehicle for 
participation among Aboriginal groups (Lipp et al., 
2016). Typically, projects involve a corporation or 
holding company that is fully owned and operated 
by a particular group on a not-for-profit basis for the 
benefit of the local community. An example is the 
Pic River Energy Corporation, which is fully owned 
by the local Ojibway people. According to Krupa 
(2012a,b), the corporate structure is similar to that 
of many corporations and includes annual general 
meetings and Aboriginal-led boards, etc., which means 
that it is fully accountable to its local community 
members (Krupa, 2012b). The Pic River Energy 
Corporation began as a minority equity partner in a 
hydro-electric site in 1982, but is now a partner in a 
portfolio of projects, including two large wind projects 
in development, which have a combined installed 
capacity of 100 MW.
3.7 Discussion
3.7.1	 Use	of	financial	incentives
Our case studies reveal the importance of introducing 
financial incentives at both the early and later stages 
of these renewable projects to establish a business 
case for local citizen participation. They also reveal 
the crucial importance of incentives to overcome 
early risks at the feasibility and development stages: 
professional developers can generally offset these 
risks by developing a portfolio of projects, but this 
option is not available to local citizens. These early-
stage project supports are particularly evident in the 
cases of Ontario and the UK, and in more recent 
years in Denmark as well. In these three cases, non-
recourse loans and grants were introduced to cover 
feasibility and development costs for local citizen 
initiatives. In Germany, however, while soft loans 
were available to cover some of the development 
costs, examples of specific financial incentives 
targeting feasibility assessments are less common. 
This can perhaps be attributed to the approach to 
project approval in Germany, which aligns planning, 
grid access and FiT contracting application, thereby 
reducing early-stage project risks (IEA-RETD, 2016). 
It perhaps also reflected the proliferation of local and 
regional groups and agencies available to support 
local citizen groups (Dewald and Truffer, 2011; 
Romero-Rubio and de Andrés Díaz, 2015) and the 
high numbers of developer-led initiatives in the wind 
sector where early-stage project risks are ameliorated 
by the professional entity.
In all cases, incentives were introduced at the later 
(construction and operation) phases of project 
development. We found that, although in the UK, 
The final session was an expert panel discussion followed by audience interaction. Participants in the panel 
discussion were Ruth Buggie (Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland), Peter Harte (Irish Wind Energy 
Association), Kate Ruddock (Friends of the Earth), Paul Kenny (Tipperary Energy Agency) and Anthony 
Rourke (Bank of Ireland). All participants were positive about the potential for citizen financial participation 
on renewable energy projects, but they highlighted the challenges of transitioning from a system where 
citizens play only a marginal role on renewable development to a system where they can play an 
increasingly central part.
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Denmark and Germany early adopters and pilot 
projects were encouraged to use grant-based 
supports, the introduction of a FiT was a crucial 
turning point and a critical success factor in mobilising 
local citizen investors at scale in all four cases. A key 
characteristic of FiTs is that they provide a stable long-
term income stream, and therefore reduced risk, and 
made it easier to access bank funding, which appears 
particularly important for local citizen actors. In all 
cases, the favourable tax treatment of income from 
renewable energy projects emerges as an important 
supplementary consideration. Indeed, the removal of 
various tax incentives in the UK has undermined the 
business case for many renewable energy projects 
since 2015.
These findings could be interpreted as supporting 
claims for the attractiveness of the FiTs themselves 
for local citizen investors (Butler and Neuhoff, 2008; 
Fouquet and Johansson, 2008; Couture and Gagnon, 
2010; del Río and Bleda, 2012; Saunders et al., 
2012). This would be of concern within the context 
of the transition from FiTs to increasingly market-
based supports, which is evident in all four cases. 
It is noteworthy, for example, that when Denmark 
transitioned from a FiT to a FiP in 2003, no new guilds 
were established in the period from 2003 to 2007 
(Meyer, 2007; Gotchev, 2015) and several existing 
guilds ceased to exist (Gotchev, 2015).
However, our case studies reveal that there are more 
important considerations than the choice of instrument 
per se. For example, specific design features were an 
important factor in the success of FiTs. In Ontario, the 
UK and Germany, FiT programmes were differentiated 
according to project size and technology type, opening 
up niche opportunities for local citizen actors. In 
Ontario, adders, set-asides and mandates have been 
used to counteract the advantages of commercial 
organisations in bringing capital-intensive projects to 
fruition and in accessing finance.
Furthermore, while the case of Denmark demonstrates 
that the transition from a FiT to a FiP was not 
seamless, the 2009 reforms illustrate that the latter 
incentive can be designed in such a way that it is 
attractive to community groups. Additionally, the case 
of Ontario illustrates that quota-based tendering 
schemes can also be designed in a manner that is 
advantageous to local community groups. The German 
and UK quota/tendering schemes, however, appear 
not to have been designed with these actors in mind 
and have created barriers to entry for them. Ultimately, 
therefore, we would concur with the findings of the 
studies (Feurtey et al., 2015; Curtin et al., 2016) that 
emphasise the importance of specific design features 
and the importance of the provision of stable financial 
revenues (Simcock et al., 2016), as opposed to the 
choice of financial incentives per se. This could be 
particularly important in the context of migration to 
more market-based supports within the EU (Ragwitz et 
al., 2012) and elsewhere.
Our cases illustrate that the cost-effectiveness of FiT 
schemes has been questioned, which has resulted 
in abrupt changes to the levels of support available. 
This regulatory uncertainty has clearly undermined 
the confidence of local citizen investors, who appear 
less resilient in the face of these changes than more 
traditional investor classes. Governments would argue 
that controlling the cost of transition to a low-carbon 
economy is a necessary priority to deliver continued 
societal buy-in. On the other hand, involving local 
citizens, who often provide their time on a voluntary 
basis (IEA-RETD, 2016; Rijpens et al., 2013), has 
been found to open up access to the optimal sites 
(for onshore wind or, for example, south-facing roof 
tops), thereby reducing cost (Nelson et al., 2016). The 
net cost-effectiveness of involving local citizens as 
investors requires further evaluation.
3.7.2 Linking incentives with typical models
Our cases reveal that a variety of innovative business 
models have emerged, offering characteristics that are 
appealing to different types of investors. These can be 
divided into those that are community led and those 
that are developer led (Bolinger, 2001).
Community-led projects are more common in the solar 
sector, where several legal forms are evident, including 
co-operatives, limited partnerships, charities, guilds 
and community interest companies. Some of these, 
such as the Danish guild and the Ontarian and UK 
co-operatives, are profit-orientated, whereas others, 
such as the UK community interest companies, are for 
the benefit of the local community. These structures 
often tend to place restrictions on the amount invested 
to avoid domination by one party and they tend to link 
their financial activity to achieving social and political 
goals of democratisation and empowerment.
Developer-led co-ownership models have become 
increasingly important in all cases, particularly in the 
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wind sector, perhaps as a response to its increased 
industrialisation and professionalisation. Wind projects 
increasingly tend to be instigated by a professional 
project developer, even in countries such as Denmark, 
where community-instigated projects were once the 
norm. Within this sector, a variety of models have 
emerged, with some more profit orientated than 
others. For example, German and Danish partnerships 
are fully commercial, whereas in the Ontarian joint 
venture, the local citizen participation is non-profit and 
surpluses are reinvested back into the community. The 
Danish approach has been successful in ensuring that 
guilds remain an important partner in onshore wind 
projects, while the German limited partnership offers 
local citizens a chance to invest in a project without 
involvement in operational decisions or strategic 
direction of projects.
In all cases – apart from the UK, where the landscape 
appears somewhat more fragmented – typical 
business models can be identified (Table 3.3).
With respect to developer-led models, governments 
have used mandates (Denmark), voluntary obligations 
(UK) or adders and minimum reserve requirements 
in FiTs and award criteria in tenders (Ontario) 
to encourage professional project developers to 
involve local communities as equity investors in 
projects. Specific models have been influenced by 
tax considerations in particular. The popularity of the 
GmbH & Co. KG structure in Germany can be linked 
to the tax treatment of depreciation: in the 1990s, 
individual investors in these partnerships were allowed 
to offset depreciation charges against all income 
(Bolinger, 2001). It remains a highly tax-efficient 
structure, even if this shelter has been phased out 
(Bolinger, 2001; Yildiz, 2014). Similarly, the tax status 
of Aboriginal communities and Danish guilds was 
influential in determining the vehicles chosen by local 
citizens to organise themselves in partnerships with 
professional developers.
It appears, therefore, that the design of the financial 
incentives that are introduced, as well as existing 
incentives implicit in the tax code, can be an important 
factor in underpinning business model innovation. 
Indeed, the choice and design of financial incentives 
have directly given rise to the emergence of typical 
models in several cases. These findings suggest 
that financial incentives can be used to promote the 
emergence of typical business models. Early financial 
advantages of a particular model over another can 
result in the replication of a “lighthouse” model and 
its emergence as a typical model. This can happen 
through word-of-mouth, or indeed through the active 
promotion of a successful model by government and 
voluntary organisations (Schreuer, 2015).
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we evaluated the use of financial 
incentives introduced at different LCT project stages 
and their importance in mobilising local citizen 
investment in Germany, Denmark, the UK and the 
Canadian state of Ontario. We also explored the 
typical business models that have emerged as 
vehicles for these investors in these jurisdictions 
and the connection between the financial incentives 
introduced and business model innovation.
It is clear that, if governments wish to successfully 
mobilise citizen investment, financial incentives must 
be considered at both the early and later stages of a 
project’s lifecycle. This enables citizen investors to 
overcome barriers at the feasibility and development 
stages of projects. The requirement for early-stage 
incentives is a distinguishing feature of projects with 
citizen involvement and appears to be central to the 
value proposition of many business models. This 
perhaps reflects the greater risk aversion of this cohort 
of investors and their inability to balance risk between 
a portfolio of projects, as is the case with professional 
project developers. Incentives are therefore required 
Table 3.3. Typical models 
Jurisdiction Community led Developer led
Denmark Guild Partnership between guild and professional developer
Germany Co-operative GmbH & Co. KG structure 
UK None None
Ontario Energy co-operative Joint venture or partnership between professional developer and 
Aboriginal non-profit corporation
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at the feasibility and development stages to mitigate 
higher early-stage project risks, although other 
measures, such as setting out clear planning, grid 
access and other procedures, are also important.
With respect to incentives introduced at later 
construction and operation phases, we conclude that 
market-independent supports such as FiTs and grants 
have been important in mobilising local citizens as 
investors. However, in contrast to previous literature, 
an implication from this study is that market-based 
supports such as FiPs and quota-based schemes, 
which are becoming increasingly popular within the EU 
and globally, can also be designed in a manner that is 
attractive to citizen investors.
In three of the four cases, we found that typical 
business models have emerged as vehicles for local 
citizen investors in both community-led and developer-
led projects. Furthermore, links between these typical 
models and the types of financial incentives that have 
been introduced are evident, and the tax treatment 
of profits appears to be a particularly important 
consideration in this respect. To the extent that tax 
relief against other income sources is available, it 
effectively underwrites the risk of the investment. 
Even if the project fails, investors can receive a rebate 
on their initial investment. It is clear, therefore, that 
financial incentives can be used to mobilise citizen 
actors, but also to promote the emergence of typical 
“off the shelf” investment models. These can reduce 
transaction, legal and professional costs, and promote 
the more widespread deployment of distributed 
renewable energy technologies controlled by local 
citizens.
In support of the proposition by Johnson and 
Suskewicz (2009), we conclude that when new 
technologies (wind and solar PV in this case) are 
combined with favourable government policy that 
promotes business model innovation in a particular 
direction, widespread system change can result. This 
process is particularly evident in early-adopter markets 
such as Denmark and Germany, and has created 
challenges for incumbent business models and actors.
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4 Use of Financial Incentives in Ireland
4.1 Introduction
A variety of technology-specific downstream financial 
incentives (see Chapter 2) have been introduced to 
mobilise investment by local citizens in low-carbon and 
resource-efficient assets in Ireland. In this chapter, 
we present an assessment of the main incentives that 
have been introduced, with the objective of drawing 
lessons for the design of future financial incentives 
(Chapter 6).
In each case, we provide a brief description of 
the incentive and an assessment of its success in 
mobilising local citizen investment in low-carbon 
assets. Where data allow, we evaluate these 
incentives using the IPCC evaluation criteria for 
climate change policy:
1. environmental effectiveness;
2. cost-effectiveness and economic efficiency
3. institutional, political and administrative feasibility 
and flexibility; and
4. distributional equity and broader social impacts 
(Somanathan et al., 2014).
To present our results, we have categorised incentives 
according to the typology proposed in Chapter 2. The 
following sections therefore consider in turn grants, 
tax incentives and FiTs/quota schemes. No soft 
loan schemes have been introduced in Ireland that 
target citizens and communities, and this category 
of incentive is therefore not considered. The chapter 
concludes by considering lessons for future policy 
development.
4.2 Grants
Several grants schemes have been introduced in 
Ireland to reduce the upfront investment costs of low-
carbon and resource-efficient technologies for citizens 
and communities.
4.1.1 The Home Energy Saving Scheme
The Irish government introduced the Home Energy 
Saving Scheme in 2009 (known as the Better Energy 
Homes Scheme since 2012). The scheme provides 
upfront grants to cover a proportion of the cost of roof 
and wall insulation, renewable and energy-efficient 
heating systems, and the cost of a building energy 
rating (BER) assessment. These grants typically 
cover between 20% and 40% of the installed cost of 
measures (Curtin, 2009).
According to the Sustainable Energy Authority of 
Ireland (SEAI), between 2009 and August 2015, 
approximately 160,000 households benefited from 
a grant for one or more measures and over 425,000 
individual measures were installed (SEAI, 2015a). 
The number of householder grants peaked in 2011, 
with 88,000 household applications approved, before 
declining significantly in 2012, 2013 and 2014 (SEAI, 
2015a). The cost to the exchequer of the programme 
was €178 million.
A cost–benefit analysis of the scheme found that it 
saved society €5 in energy, CO2 and other pollutants 
for every € 1 spent (in net present value terms). 
Participating households were estimated to save 
an average of €450 per annum on energy bills and 
to reduce CO2 emissions by approximately 1.5 
tonnes per dwelling (Motherway and Scheer, 2011). 
Furthermore, billing and survey analysis found that 
participants in the scheme saved an average of 
21% on their annual gas bill, enjoyed warmer, more 
comfortable houses and saw substantial improvements 
in their BER (Scheer et al., 2013).
Furthermore, applicants for a Home Energy Saving 
grant come from a relatively wide cross section 
of society and not just from better-off households, 
although single-adult households are somewhat 
underrepresented (SEAI, 2014a). The Better Energy 
Warmer Homes Scheme also provides retrofits for 
owner-occupied fuel-poor households that may not be 
in a position to apply for a grant, addressing to some 
extent the negative potential distributional implications 
of the scheme.
Cavity insulation, roof insulation and BER 
assessments, the cheaper interventions for which 
grants are available, accounted for the majority of 
overall applications (SEAI, 2015a), although external 
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wall insulation accounted for 26% of overall grant 
funding. An average spend of approximately €3000 
was recorded, which includes the grant payment 
of approximately €1000 (Curtin and Maguire, 2011; 
Curtin, 2013). A very significant proportion of funding 
has therefore been used to promote cost-effective and 
mature technologies with short payback periods.
The scheme is challenging to administer and 
requires individual processing of each grant, quality 
assurance of contractors and technologies, auditing 
of interventions, ongoing assessment of impacts and 
take-up, and so on. Annual budgeting can also create 
challenges and has led to rapid and unpredictable 
fluctuations in market activity from year to year (e.g. 
between 2011 and 2012), in response to changes in 
the amount of government funding available and the 
level of grants provided. Fluctuations in market activity 
of this nature make the creation of a sustainable 
market in retrofitting challenging and creates difficulties 
for private contractors, businesses and investors in the 
sector.
4.2.2 Better Energy Communities
The Energy Communities programme, launched 
in 2012, supports new approaches to achieving 
high-quality improvements in energy efficiency 
within Irish communities and supports the use of 
renewable energy where possible. The programme 
is aimed at promoting the use of innovative financial 
approaches, such as energy performance contracting, 
and creating innovative partnership approaches that 
facilitate community access to existing local resources. 
Between 2012 and 2015, a total of €126 million in 
grants was provided (SEAI, 2016b).
Projects generally involve partnerships between local 
authorities or public sector organisations, small to 
medium-sized enterprises, voluntary organisations, 
private sector actors and local community residents or 
groups. Grants typically cover 35–50% of the project 
cost, depending on the actors involved, but this can be 
up to 80% in the “energy poor” sector (SEAI, 2016b).
While no full economic evaluation of the programme 
has been undertaken, each project is assessed 
for value in terms of money to the exchequer, 
considering energy and carbon savings. The scheme 
has successfully mobilised 261 local community 
actors to deliver projects. These projects delivered 
energy efficiency and renewable energy retrofits in 
over 12,000 private and public buildings, supporting 
several hundred jobs each year (SEAI, 2017a). 
The programme promotes once-off projects rather 
than long-term sustainable energy communities. It 
should be noted, however, that one-off niche projects 
may act as catalysts for future community-based 
projects by shaping and supporting local market 
formation processes (Kemp et al., 1998; Dewald 
and Truffer, 2011) and can promote acceptance of 
renewable technologies. As with the Home Energy 
Savings Scheme, this scheme requires considerable 
administrative oversight, as each application 
requires assessment and ranking, and considerable 
administrative challenges arise from annual budget 
allocations from the exchequer.
4.2.3 Greener Homes Scheme
The Greener Homes Scheme was established 
to stimulate the market for renewable heating 
technologies with a view to promoting the development 
of a long-term market for these technologies. Its 
objective was to decrease Ireland’s reliance on fossil 
fuels and to reduce CO2 emissions. Under the scheme, 
grants were available for renewable heating systems. 
Grant-aided technologies and the levels of grant 
available are given in Table 4.1 (SEAI, 2013).
Between 2006 and 2011, a total of 33,065 installed 
measures were grant aided under this scheme (Table 
4.2) (SEAI, 2008), accounting for nearly €75 million in 
government revenue. Solar water heaters, the most 
cost-effective of the grant-aided technologies (Claudy, 
‎2011), accounted for 63% of total applications, with 
biomass boilers and heat pumps accounting for 18%.
An economic evaluation shows that the cost of 
CO2 emissions by installation of biomass and wood 
gasification boilers under the scheme is high (ESRI, 
2011). The success of the scheme in achieving 
its other objectives, such as the development of a 
sustainable market in renewable heating technologies, 
has not been evaluated. It appears, however, that the 
technologies covered have not achieved widespread 
market adoption in the residential sector.
As with other grants programmes, there are 
administrative challenges as well as challenges 
associated with annual budgeting. While there are no 
data available on the demographic characteristics of 
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Table 4.1. Grants available under Greener Homes Scheme
Technology Grant available (€)
Heat pump – vertical ground heat pump 3500
Heat pump – horizontal ground 2500
Heat pump – water to water 2500
Heat pump – air source 2000
Solar flat plate 250/m2 (to maximum of 6 m2)
Solar evacuated 300/m2 (to maximum of 6 m2)
Wood gasification boiler 2000
Biomass boiler 2500
Biomass stove 800
Biomass stove and back boiler 1400
Source: SEAI (2013)
Table 4.2. Summary assessment of Irish grants
Initiative Type Target Effectiveness Efficiency Administration Distributional impacts
Home Energy 
Savings 
(Better 
Energy 
Homes)
Grant Household Mobilised 
160,000 
household 
investments in 
EE and RES 
technologies 
Assessments 
show overall cost-
effectiveness of 
programme for 
society
However, focused 
on technologies 
considered cost-
effective without 
subsidy (attic 
and cavity wall 
insulation)
Considerable 
challenges in 
administering grants, 
quality assurance, 
auditing, etc.
Short-term programme 
with annual budgeting 
creates variety of 
challenges, including 
potential for boom–bust 
investment cycles
Negative distributional 
implications limited 
by broad take-up 
across socio-economic 
categories
Supplemented by 
Warmer Homes scheme 
for fuel poor
Better Energy 
Communities
Grant Community 
group
Mobilised 261 
pilot community 
investments in 
energy retrofits 
covering 12,000 
buildings 
Value for money 
assessment 
undertaken for 
each application, 
considers energy 
savings relative to 
exchequer cost
No ex post 
assessment 
of projects yet 
undertaken
Considerable 
challenges in 
administering grants, 
quality assurance, 
auditing, etc.
Short-term programme 
with annual budgeting 
creates variety of 
challenges
Envisaged as pilot/
exemplar project 
promoting public 
acceptability and 
understanding of LCTs
Projects target fuel poor 
who are eligible for 
higher grants
Greener 
Homes 
Scheme
Grant Individual Over 33,000 
renewable 
heating 
measures 
installed in 
residential 
buildings
Economic 
assessment 
shows high carbon 
abatement cost per 
unit of expenditure
No public 
assessment 
of programme 
undertaken in 
relation to its stated 
objectives 
Considerable 
challenges in grant 
approval, quality 
assurance, auditing, 
etc.
Short-term programme 
with annual budgeting 
creates variety of 
challenges
Pilot programme 
intended to drive uptake 
among early adaptors 
and building awareness 
and acceptance of new 
technologies
No data available, but it 
is likely that programme 
take-up focused on 
wealthier cohorts given 
technology cost
Battery 
Electric 
Vehicle 
Scheme
Grant/
tax
Individual Mobilised 
investment in 
only 200 EVs 
per annum 
No public economic 
evaluation 
undertaken
Low administrative 
costs
Pilot project aimed at 
driving uptake among 
early adaptors
Likely that programme 
focused on wealthier 
cohorts given technology 
cost 
EE, energy efficient; EV, electric vehicle; RES, renewable energy source.
33
McInerney and Curtin (2014-SE-MS-1)
grant applicants, it is likely that, given the high cost of 
supported technologies, the uptake may have been 
concentrated among wealthier cohorts. These cohorts, 
however, may be considered “early adaptors” and the 
programme may be justified on this basis.
4.2.4 Electric vehicles
A grant scheme, introduced in 2010, is available for 
battery-powered electric vehicle (EVs) and plug-in 
hybrids that meet specific standards. The maximum 
grant is €5000 for EVs over €20,000 (€1500 for 
hybrids and €2500 for plug-in hybrids). This incentive 
was combined with vehicle registration tax (VRT) 
exemption for EVs and lower VRT costs for hybrids.
As of 2014, there were 8607 licensed hybrid electric 
motor cars, 9293 licensed flexible fuel motor cars 
and approximately 529 EVs in Ireland. Approximately 
1100 EVs were sold between 2010 and the end of 
2015, compared with the government target of 10% 
of all cars being EVs by 2020 (approximately 200,000 
vehicles). The scheme has therefore not mobilised 
significant citizen investment. This has been attributed 
to the existence of “other bottlenecks”, such as, 
until relatively recently, the lack of infrastructure and 
“broader transport patterns in Ireland” (Department 
of Finance, 2015). International experience suggests 
that consumer awareness and trust of the technology 
and a series of other factors may also be at play 
(see Chapter 2) and that financial incentives, while 
necessary, are not sufficient to guarantee high 
adoption rates (Sierzchula et al., 2014).
While no data are available, it is likely that programme 
take-up focused on wealthier cohorts, given the cost 
of technologies supported. On the other hand, the 
scheme could be seen to have targeted early adaptors 
and may have played a role in building awareness of 
this relatively new low-carbon option in society, which 
is necessary prior to paving the way to widespread 
uptake. The administrative costs are low because 
the grant is provided to the dealer and the benefit is 
passed on to the purchaser as a price reduction at the 
point of sale. No economic evaluation of the scheme 
has been undertaken.
4.3 Tax Incentives
There have been a number of tax incentives that have 
either directly or indirectly mobilised community and 
individual investments in the resource-efficient and 
low-carbon sectors.
4.3.1 The Employment Enterprise Investment 
Scheme
The Employment Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(2011), formerly the Business Expansion Scheme 
(1984), is an income tax incentive to encourage 
private investors to invest equity capital in small and 
medium-sized companies. The primary objective 
of the scheme is to provide an alternative source 
of finance to small and medium-sized and start-up 
enterprises and to support the creation and retention 
of employment in small and medium-sized enterprises 
across the economy. Tax relief is available to investors 
at the marginal rate of 41% when shares are held for 
a minimum of 5 years and up to 30% when shares are 
held for 3 years, for investments of up to €150,000 
per annum in qualifying companies. Companies can 
raise a maximum of €2.5 million in a 12-month period 
(Department of Finance, 2014). Since 2011, it has 
been easier for companies producing energy from 
renewable sources to qualify for relief compared with 
the earlier scheme.
Between 2007 and 2014, 2198 applications were 
made and €485 million was raised by companies 
under the schemes, from over 20,000 individual 
investors. A total of 183 investments, accounting for 
€67.3 million, were in sustainable- and renewable-
related companies, in particular wind energy. 
Hydropower, solar, wave and wind generation, 
biomass and forestry and anaerobic digestion also 
represented a significant amount of investment (Table 
4.3). The scheme has therefore been a significant 
source of capital for mobilising citizen investment in 
low-carbon and resource-efficient sectors.
There has been a lack of comprehensive 
evaluations of the scheme, partly attributable to a 
lack of availability of data on the scheme’s impact 
(Department of Finance, 2014). Among bodies that 
have considered the economic importance of the 
scheme (including the Commission on Taxation and 
the Innovation Task Force) there is consensus that 
it is effective and economically beneficial in terms 
of output, competitiveness and employment. This is 
because it addresses a key market failure affecting 
the availability of equity for start-ups and small and 
medium-sized enterprises (Department of Finance, 
2014).
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Compared with grant-based approaches, these types 
of schemes are easier to administer. Tax schemes 
of this nature also tend to have the benefit of being 
multi-annual (the current scheme has been extended 
to 2020), unlike grant schemes, which tend to be 
constrained by annual budgeting.
On the other hand, a review of the scheme suggests 
that there was a high administrative burden on 
companies seeking to avail themselves of the tax 
incentive and that there is a low level of awareness 
of the scheme among enterprises (Department of 
Finance, 2014). Stakeholders have recommended 
that it be promoted more widely among enterprises. 
However, there has been little consideration of how 
the scheme could be made more accessible to local 
citizens and levels of awareness of the scheme for 
potential smaller-scale investors (local citizens in 
particular) has not been considered in evaluations.
A related drawback of the scheme is that it tends 
to only be accessible to wealthier segments of 
society, which are more likely to have access to an 
accountant for tax-planning purposes. An analysis of 
266 investments undertaken by the Department of 
Finance shows that 44% of total investments were for 
more than €100,000 (Department of Finance, 2014), 
underpinning this point. In the past, the Department of 
Finance has expressed concern that these individuals 
can, by means of the cumulative use of various tax 
incentive reliefs, reduce their income tax liability to a 
very low level. To address this issue, a “high earners” 
restriction was introduced in 2007, which limited the 
amount of relief that can be claimed in any one year 
to €80,000. In Budget 2014, however, the initial 30% 
tax relief under the scheme was excluded from the 
high earners’ restriction for a period of 3 years, to 
encourage a higher level of investments.
4.3.2 The Bike to Work Scheme
Since January 2009, employees have been 
incentivised to purchase a bicycle. The purpose of 
the scheme is to encourage more employees to cycle 
to and from work, or between work places, thereby 
contributing to lowering carbon emissions, reducing 
traffic congestion and improving health and fitness 
levels.
Under the scheme, the employer provides the bicycle 
and/or safety equipment to an employee who agrees 
to forego or sacrifice part of his or her salary every pay 
period to cover the cost of the benefit, up to €1000. 
Employees may avail themselves of the scheme up 
to once every 5 years. The employee repays the 
purchase price through deductions from his or her 
gross salary during the subsequent months.
The bicycle and safety equipment are therefore 
exempt from tax and the employee will not be liable 
to income tax (including employee pay-related social 
insurance (PRSI) or the universal social charge) at 
their marginal rate and will therefore not be taxed on 
the purchase price of the bike, nor is the employee 
liable for benefits-in-kind taxation. Another benefit 
for the employer is that the employer’s PRSI is not 
payable on the cost of the bicycle and/or safety 
equipment. Employees can save up to 52% of the 
cost of the bike, while employers save 10.75% in 
employer’s PRSI (IBBA, 2011). The scheme has 
therefore combined an attractive tax incentive 
and no-cost finance (effectively a soft loan) with a 
convenient repayment mechanism.
There are no official statistics on the uptake of the 
scheme available because there is no notification 
procedure for employers to indicate to the Revenue 
Commissioners that they are availing themselves 
of the scheme. According to the Irish Bike Business 
Association (IBBA), however, the scheme has been 
extremely popular and has significantly boosted bike 
sales (IBBA, 2011). The number commuting by bike 
has increased significantly since the introduction of the 
scheme in 2009 (Figure 4.1), although it is not possible 
to say if this has arisen in response to the scheme 
itself.
Table 4.3. Enterprise Investment Scheme 
investments in low-carbon and resource-efficient 
sectors
Amount (€) Number of 
fundraisings
Wind 49,256,704 110
Biomass and forestry 7,852,549 26
Energy efficiency 2,754,331 15
Wave and hydro 2,010,000 2
Anaerobic digestion 970,500 3
Other 4,393,747 27
Total 67,237,831 183
Source: based on Revenue Commissioners (2015)
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While the IBBA has made an attempt to set out some 
of the costs and benefits of the scheme (IBBA, 2011), 
no economic evaluation has been undertaken, and 
the absence of reliable data on the scheme makes 
it challenging to evaluate. It is notable, however, 
that the scheme has no administrative costs for the 
government. The availability of a reliable repayment 
mechanism and the removal of the upfront cost 
barrier through the provision of no-cost finance are 
clearly attractive design features from an employee 
perspective. It appears to have limited barriers to entry 
for employers and employees given the relatively low 
levels of finance required and the relatively simple 
administrative processes.
4.3.3 Plastic bag tax
A plastic bag environmental levy of €0.15 was placed 
on plastic shopping bags in March 2002 and raised to 
€0.22 in 2007. Retailers must pass on the full amount 
of the levy as a charge to customers at the checkout. 
The charge for the plastic shopping bag is itemised on 
all invoices, receipts and dockets issued to customers. 
The charge was introduced to encourage the purchase 
and use of reusable bags and to help change 
attitudes to litter and pollution. Revenue generated 
from the plastic bag environmental levy goes into the 
Environmental Fund, which is used to support waste 
management, litter and other environmental initiatives. 
Approximately €20 million per annum was levied in the 
first decade of the scheme.
The introduction of the levy resulted in 90% of 
consumers using long-life bags within a year. Bag 
usage dropped from an estimated 328 bags per 
person per annum prior to the introduction of the levy 
to 14 bags per annum by the end of 2012. Plastic 
shopping bags accounted for only small fraction of 
total litter in 2014 according to the National Litter 
Pollution Monitoring in comparison with 5% prior to 
the introduction of the levy (DECLG, 2014). Revenues 
have also supported pro-environmental activities.
4.3.4 Vehicle registration tax and annual car 
tax
A new system of assessing private cars for VRT 
and annual motor tax came into effect in July 2008 
for vehicles purchased in 2008 or later. The system 
moved away from assessing vehicles based on engine 
size to one that is based solely on the CO2 emissions 
per kilometre. Seven tax bands were originally used 
for the VRT assessment, with the bands corresponding 
to the EU labelling system. The number of bands 
was extended to 11 in January 2013 (SEAI, 2014b). 
The economic rationale for the change was based 
on evidence that individuals did not fully consider 
the implications of car purchase decisions (in terms 
Figure 4.1. Number of people commuting by bicycle in Dublin. Source: Dublin City Council (2016).
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of running costs over the car’s lifetime) and valued 
the present very highly, leading them to undervalue 
improvements in vehicle efficiencies (see, for example, 
Lane and Potter (2007) and Metcalfe and Dolan 
(2012)).
The recalibration of VRT and motor taxation on 
CO2 efficiency has had a significant impact on car-
purchasing decisions. Prior to the introduction of 
these bands, the average new vehicle purchased had 
emissions in the region of 166 g/km (this fluctuated 
around 165–168 g/km since 2000 until the changes 
introduced in July 2008) (SEAI, 2014b). In 2009, 
the first full year of the new scheme, the average 
emissions of a new vehicle entering the national fleet 
had reduced to around 145 g/km. By 2015 this had 
fallen further to 114 g/km, which is comparable with the 
EU average of 119.6 g/km (EEA, 2016).
No full economic evaluation of the scheme has been 
undertaken to assess the impact on society (Table 
4.4). However, concerns have been raised about 
the revenue implications of the new scheme. The 
Department of Finance noted that revenues from VRT 
fell from €1121 billion in 2008 to €375 million in 2009. 
However, as it also notes, this is a pro-cyclical tax, and 
a dramatic drop in car purchases (by 63% in 2009) 
accounted for the majority of the difference. VRT rates 
recovered in 2015 following the recovery of new car 
sales and the recalibration of the scheme in 2013. This 
recalibration was intended to increase the incentive to 
purchase less environmentally harmful motor cars and 
to increase revenue.
Administratively, the scheme requires ongoing 
monitoring from year to year to ensure that 
government revenues are stable and that a continued 
signal to purchase efficient vehicles is delivered, in 
response to fast-moving technological developments. 
It is unclear if any such monitoring is undertaken.
4.4 FITs and Tendering/Quota 
Schemes
A tendering scheme was introduced in Ireland in 1998 
to support the deployment of wind energy in Ireland, 
Table 4.4. Summary assessment of Irish tax incentives
Initiative Type Target Effectiveness Efficiency Administration Distributional impacts
Employment 
Enterprise 
Investment 
Scheme
Tax Individual Mobilised €67 
million investment 
in sustainable 
and renewable 
energy companies 
between 2007 and 
2014
Economically 
beneficial in 
terms of output, 
competitiveness 
and employment; 
lack of data makes 
full evaluation 
challenging
No administrative 
burden for government
Multiannual extensions 
boosted market 
confidence
Low awareness of 
scheme among ordinary 
citizens and SMEs
Negative distributional 
implications with 
potential for use by 
wealthier cohorts to 
minimise tax burden
Considerable barriers to 
entry and high average 
levels of investment
Cycle 
to Work 
Scheme
Tax
(and 
soft 
loan)
Individual Mobilised 
commuters to 
invest in bicycles; 
linked to increased 
numbers of cyclists 
commuting 
Lack of reliable 
data makes 
economic 
evaluation 
challenging
No administrative 
burden; no requirement 
to notify revenue
Low barriers of entry 
and relatively low 
levels of investment 
(under €1000) makes it 
accessible and socially 
inclusive for employers 
and employees 
Plastic bag 
tax
Tax Individual 90% of consumers 
started using long-
life bags within a 
year
Creation of 
revenue stream; 
reduced land fill 
and litter costs
Low administrative 
burden
High level of political 
acceptability, possibly 
due to low level of 
charge and availability 
of alternatives
Possibly regressive, but 
builds social awareness 
on environmental and 
resource efficiency 
issues
VRT and 
annual car 
tax reform
Tax Individual Strong shift 
in consumer 
purchase decisions 
towards more 
efficient vehicles
No economic 
evaluation taken 
for society, 
concern of impact 
on government 
revenue overstated
Requires ongoing 
monitoring to ensure 
stability of government 
revenues and continued 
signal to purchase 
efficient vehicles 
No clear social 
or distributional 
implications
SME, small and medium-sized enterprise.
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called the Alternative Energy Requirement programme. 
The programme involved generators tendering to 
provide a fixed amount of renewable energy capacity. 
It was believed that a tendering scheme would be 
a low-cost way of incentivising renewable energy, 
provided that no strategic bidding took place in the 
auctions (Huber et al., 2007). Many of those who 
won contracts tendered bids that were too low and, 
consequently, a considerable number of wind farms 
were never built (Doherty and O’Malley, 2011).
A FiT (the REFIT Scheme) replaced the tendering 
scheme in 2006 with the aim of supporting 400 MW 
of renewable energy generation. Under the scheme, 
support was made available to suppliers through 
the provision of a floor price for the electricity they 
supply for 15 years. If the energy market revenue 
of the project falls below the floor price, the relevant 
supply company will be refunded the difference from 
the public service obligation (PSO) mechanism (paid 
for by electricity bill payers). In addition, a “balancing 
payment” was introduced to cover notional costs of 
“balancing”, set at 15% of the indexed floor price per 
MWh for all technology categories, including wind.
REFIT 2, which succeeded REFIT 1, operated 
between March 2012 and December 2015. It provided 
up to 4000 MW of renewable energy generation. The 
same technology categories and 15-year period of 
support applied, with a similar balancing mechanism in 
place. In addition, REFIT 3 is designed to incentivise 
the addition of 310 MW of renewable electricity 
Box 4.1. Templederry community wind farm
Ireland’s REFIT has resulted in the development of only one community-owned wind farm, in Templederry, 
County Tipperary.
Templederry community is located on the northern edge of the Slieve Felim Mountains, between the main 
urban centres of Nenagh (north) and Thurles (south) in County Tipperary. It has suffered from population 
decline and there are limited local employment opportunities. As a result, the Community/Local Area 
Development Plan (1999) identified renewable energy as key to sustainable development in the area. Four 
individuals from the community subsequently completed a Certificate in Renewable Energy at the Tipperary 
Institute and sought to develop a wind energy project in the region, with the primary objective of creating 
economic development. These local leaders have been identified as key catalysts and protagonists for the 
project, without whom success would not have been achieved.
The group set up a dedicated wind development company, Templederry Wind Farm Ltd, and invited the 
community to become shareholders. They made clear which risks were involved, given that wind energy 
was a new concept to most, and looked for an initial capital investment of €1000 per person. Thirty equal 
shareholders came together.
Tipperary Energy Agency (TEA) was a vital partner throughout the process, assisting the group with a 
feasibility study, and the community group then purchased an anemometer, which was erected on the site 
(selected in conjunction with TEA). The group submitted a planning application and planning permission 
was granted in 2003. The group originally received planning permission for the erection of three 1.3 MW 
wind turbines in June 2003, but a moratorium on grid connections was imposed at this time. Momentum 
was maintained in this difficult period by enthusiasm from leaders of the project.
By the time the moratorium was lifted (nearly 4 years later), the planning permit had expired. In 2010, it was 
resubmitted and changed to two 2.3 MW turbines, but at this stage the financial crisis meant that their initial 
banking deal fell through. Enercon, the company behind Templederry’s wind turbines, made an introduction 
to Rabobank, whose subsidiary company De Lage Landen provided project finance for the turbines. The 
group raised the rest of the funding from a range of sources, including shareholder equity, LEADER grant 
aid, an Enercon loan and the Business Expansion Scheme (Tipperary Energy Agency, 2014). It finally 
started selling electricity to the grid in November 2012. This is the first community-owned wind farm in 
operation in Ireland.
38
Promoting Citizen Investment in Low-carbon Assests
capacity to the Irish grid, composed of combined heat 
and power, biomass combustion and biomass co-firing. 
Demand for the biomass combined heat and power 
category has exceeded the original allocation and is 
significantly below the original allocations for the other 
two categories.
The scheme has resulted in mass deployment of wind 
energy in Ireland. In 2015, wind power accounted for 
24% of total electricity generated (IWEA, 2017). The 
FiT is projected to mobilise a €12.5 billion investment 
in the period leading up to 2020 in Ireland (IWEA, 
2011) or an annual investment of €430 million per 
annum by 2020.
The scheme to date has primarily been designed 
with larger scale developers in mind. While there are 
little data available on community and local citizen 
investment, only a very small proportion of wind power 
was generated by community groups (3.9 MW out of 
circa 2200 MW, or approximately 0.2%). In addition, 
there may be some farmer-owned projects, and, as 
noted in section 2.1.1, the EIS has mobilised some 
investment in wind energy, but this is relatively modest 
in comparison with overall investment levels.
Economic evaluations of the scheme suggest that 
it has been a cost-effective way of decarbonising 
electricity generation. An assessment by SEAI 
suggests that there are positive macroeconomic/gross 
domestic product (GDP) and employment benefits 
to be had from the scheme and a joint Eirgrid–SEAI 
report found that wind power lowered wholesale prices 
(SEAI–Eirgrid, 2011; SEAI, 2015b) (Table 4.5).
Given the closure of REFIT 2 in June 2015, a new 
support scheme is being considered for renewable 
energy, which, according to the Department of 
Finance, is likely to take the form of a FiT or a FiP, 
depending on the size of the installation. There are, 
however, variations within these high-level designs, 
which would include fixed tariffs, tariffs that are paid 
within high and low limits (termed cap and floor), 
contracts for difference based on a strike price 
or floating/indexed tariffs relative to a reference. 
There are also design options available that target 
community and individual investors. The Department 
of Communications, Climate Action and the 
Environment (DCCAE) also notes that other supports 
may be available, such as grants and soft loans.
4.5 Conclusions
A variety of incentives have been introduced in Ireland 
to promote investment in low-carbon and resource-
efficient assets and technologies by citizens. In many 
cases, however, there is a lack of data available on 
these schemes. Comprehensive ex post evaluations 
are the exception rather than the rule, and even when 
they have been undertaken, the focus is generally on 
environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. 
They seldom consider other factors proposed by 
IPCC (e.g. administrative feasibility and distributional 
issues). In some cases, such as the Bike to Work 
Scheme, it might be beneficial to require employers to 
notify Revenue when a scheme is being used in order 
to improve data availability and to enable assessment 
of the scheme’s effectiveness.
In many ways, Ireland’s experiences with these 
incentives mirrors international experience (see 
Chapters 2 and 3). Grants appear to have been 
effective in mobilising investment from citizen 
investors in new LCTs. The exception is the grant for 
EVs, illustrating the prevalence of multiple (network 
or technological) barriers in addition to high upfront 
investment costs. Grants can, in some cases, also be 
cost-effective for the exchequer and for society, but 
they are subject to challenges, such as annual funding 
allocations from the exchequer, which in turn can 
Table 4.5. Summary assessment of Irish FiT
Initiative Type Target Effectiveness Efficiency Administration Distributional Impacts
REFIT FiT Corporate/
individual 
and some 
community
Mobilised substantial 
investment in wind, 
mostly from corporate 
and professional project 
developers rather than 
from individuals or 
community groups
Economic 
evaluations find 
positive effects 
for electricity 
prices, GDP and 
employment
Administrative 
burden of 
assessing 
and approving 
contracts 
No negative distributional 
implications as lower 
electricity prices offset PSO
Considerable community 
mobilisation against roll-
out of wind energy in local 
communities
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lead to boom–bust investment cycles and make the 
formation of a sustainable market challenging. When 
programmes (such as the Greener Homes Scheme) 
have been discontinued, there is little evidence that 
they have achieved their longer term objectives of 
creating sustainable markets. Grants also tend to 
be challenging from an administrative perspective 
and can favour wealthier cohorts in society, although 
this seems not to have been the case with the Home 
Energy Savings Scheme. Furthermore, schemes such 
as the Home Energy Saving Scheme appear to have 
an element of path dependency, with only incremental 
modifications to the original design having occurred 
over the following decade.
Tax incentives that have been introduced (in 
particular the Bike to Work Scheme, changes to 
motor taxes and the plastic bag levy) have been 
highly effective in modifying consumer behaviour. 
The Enterprise Investment Scheme has also been 
effective in mobilising investment from high net worth 
individuals in low-carbon and resource-efficient 
sectors. These tax incentive schemes have been 
favourable to grant schemes in two respects: they do 
not necessarily require annual budget allocations from 
the exchequer (and can be extended for pre-agreed 
periods of time); and they tend to be considerably 
easier to administer and to access than grants 
(where a complex application procedure is generally 
required). The Bike to Work Scheme was designed in 
a user-friendly manner and has low barriers to entry, 
from both an employee and an employer perspective.
The downsides of tax schemes are that predicting the 
impact ex ante can be challenging and they can, to 
some extent, become victims of their own successes. 
For example, the VRT/motor tax changes that were 
introduced led to a rapid change in car-purchasing 
behaviour and had some impact on government 
revenues; however, the negative impacts arose mostly 
from exogenous factors. It appears, furthermore, 
that, compared with grant schemes, there have been 
fewer (public) evaluations of tax incentive schemes 
undertaken, perhaps because funding is not perceived 
as coming directly from exchequer sources per se.
Finally, the design of the FiT illustrates that, if 
citizens and community investors are not specifically 
considered in instrument design, the incentive will 
favour professional project developers. The latter 
have the skills, expertise, experience and balance 
sheets to get projects over the line and can balance 
(early-stage) risks over a portfolio of projects in a 
way that is not possible for community and citizen 
investors. In fact, these early-stage project risks are 
best considered a discrete barrier affecting community 
investors (Chapter 3), and the Irish experience 
suggests that the central (FiT) incentive needs to be 
supported by early-stage project supports such as 
grants or provision of information and advice (Chapter 
3) if galvanising citizen and community investors is a 
policy priority.
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7 Personal communications with a representative sample of professional developers on a confidential basis.
5.1 Introduction
Governments, both internationally and in Ireland, 
have trialled a number of approaches to mobilise local 
citizens as investors, covering, among other things:
 ● grants for specific projects;
 ● tax incentives and tax breaks for investment;
 ● FiT, FiPs and quota-based schemes with manda-
tory financial participation criteria for local citizens; 
and
 ● soft loans for investors (Chapters 2 and 3).
In addition to these financial incentives, a number 
of new approaches such as crowdfunding and 
the purchasing of debentures through a regulated 
investment platform are opening up new investment 
options for local citizens.
These approaches to promoting citizen financial 
participation have advantages and disadvantages, 
and vary in their effectiveness depending on the local 
context, the technology, the type of investor and the 
maturity of the market for local citizen investment 
(Curtin et al., 2016). Furthermore, it is an open 
question in the literature if the successes achieved 
in countries such as Denmark and Germany can 
be replicated in other countries. As discussed  in 
Chapter 1, some studies (Dewald and Truffer, 2011; 
Romero-Rubio and de Andrés Díaz, 2015) identify 
context-specific enabling factors in countries such as 
Germany, which suggests that their experiences might 
not be transferable to other contexts.
Within this context, Ireland is an interesting case. 
Wind energy has expanded rapidly, but, in contrast 
to Germany and Denmark, investment has been 
driven by utilities and professional project developers. 
Furthermore, there are no examples of citizen 
investment in biomass, waste or solar technologies. 
This may have affected societal buy-in and has 
resulted in a greater emphasis on mobilising citizen 
and community investment in the 2014 Energy White 
Paper (Chapter 1).
Given the lack of experience of Irish citizens as 
investors in these technologies, however, there is an 
absence of data to support the proposition that local 
citizens are interested in becoming investors in LCTs. 
Some professional project developers have argued 
that Irish citizens are different from their European 
counterparts in this respect.7 It is unclear if there 
would be an appetite for investment in low-carbon 
and resource-efficient technologies, and if so what 
financial factors and investment attributes would be 
important for potential citizen investors. Furthermore, 
it is unclear what key barriers to investment exist. To 
fill these research gaps, we undertook a survey of 
citizen investment in low-carbon and resource-efficient 
technologies.
In this chapter, we present preliminary findings from 
this survey. Full findings will be published in an 
academic journal article in due course. We first explain 
the methodology for the survey. We next present 
an overview of key findings and an assessment of 
barriers to investment. We then present preliminary 
data on the results of our choice experiment, which 
provides insights into what investment attributes and 
levels are important for Irish citizen investors (see 
section 5.3). Finally, in the conclusions section we 
assess implications for the design of government 
interventions.
5.2 Survey Design
To explore citizen investors’ preferences for investing 
in renewable energy projects, we undertook a survey 
of Irish citizens using adaptive choice-based conjoint 
analysis (ACBC). This involves offering respondents 
(who indicated a willingness to consider investing) 
realistic, though hypothetical, choices between 
investments with different attributes in a real-time 
environment, with the objective of deriving their utility 
function.
Because conjoint approaches are often used to 
investigate preferences for product attributes in 
immature markets, they are ideal for our purposes. 
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Unlike Germany or Denmark, citizen investment in 
renewables is an immature market in Ireland with very 
limited awareness or opportunities to invest. Moreover, 
conjoint analysis has been applied to a variety of 
research fields, including the general investment 
decision literature and the renewable investment 
literature (Salm et al., 2016).
To inform survey design, we undertook a literature 
review and six semi-structured stakeholder interviews 
with key experts between September 2016 and 
December 2016. The objective of the interviews was 
to identify relevant technologies and key potential 
investment attributes in the Irish market and possible 
levels of these attributes. Interviewees included 
professional project developers, financial sector 
professionals, advisors to community energy projects, 
energy utilities and government officials.
We identified six investment attributes in total. In the 
case of five of these, three levels of these attributes 
were identified (Table 5.1), based on the typical current 
characteristics of future potential characteristics of 
investment opportunities in the Irish market. In the 
case of return on investment, this was treated as a 
continuous pricing attribute, so that a large number of 
unique prices were shown to respondents between 2% 
and 9%.
The survey was structured as follows: all respondents 
were asked if they were interested in investing in 
renewables “if their ideal investment criteria were met”. 
If respondents indicated that they were not willing to 
consider investing (“no” to the first question), they were 
forwarded immediately to the end of the survey where 
they were asked to identify key barriers to investment 
and to provide socio-demographic data.
If they answered “yes” or “maybe”, they were asked 
how much they would be willing to invest and 
were then directed to the choice experiment. The 
choice experiment itself was made up of a number 
of parts. First, participants were required to “build 
your own” (BYO) preferred investment by choosing 
from one of the attribute levels in each attribute (this 
section excluded return on investment and risk, as 
respondents were expected to prefer high returns 
and low risk). Second, the survey continued with 
a screening task section. In this part of the survey, 
respondents evaluated four investment options at the 
same time, with different attributes, and were required 
to indicate if they were suitable or not (Figure 5.1).
Respondents were offered 24 choices in total (six 
windows) in which the options were presented, 
which revolved around the BYO with one or two 
variations each time. Respondents’ choices were 
used to determine if non-compensatory rules were 
being applied to make investment choices, e.g. 
where an attribute level is unacceptable and cannot 
be compensated by an increase in another desirable 
attribute level. Finally, in the last part of the survey, 
Table 5.1. Attributes and levels
Attribute Level
Return on investment Between 2% and 9%
Technology Onshore wind
Solar electricity
Biomass (heat and renewable gas generated from wood, manure and other organic materials)
Partner A community group (such as a co-operative)
A private sector company
A public sector company 
Minimum holding period 2 years
5 years
10 years 
Risk of losing investment capital No risk (0% risk)
Low risk (less than 10% risk)
Moderate risk (between 10% and 25% risk)
Location In your local area
In your county
Anywhere in Ireland
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the “choice tournament”, respondents were asked to 
choose between one of three competing investment 
options (defined according to specific attribute levels). 
This part of the survey was focused on exploring the 
remaining differences in the investment opportunities 
that had been identified. This allowed a better 
estimation of zero-centred utilities for the attribute 
levels of lower tier important attributes. Following this 
choice tournament, respondents were directed to a 
section on barriers, before finally providing socio-
demographic data.
In addition to data on what types of investments might 
be of interest to citizen investors, the survey design 
allowed us to gather information on what key barriers 
to investment existed for cohorts that were willing to 
consider investing and those who were not.
5.3 High-level Findings
A total of 1680 survey respondents were recruited from 
an Irish-based data access panel, and the survey was 
administered in January 2017. Of the total, 400 did 
not complete the full survey and these respondents’ 
answers were therefore not considered in the analysis.
As described, respondents were first asked if they 
would be willing to invest in a renewable energy 
project given an attractive investment opportunity 
where their “ideal investment criteria are met”. Only 
those who answered “yes” or “maybe” proceeded 
to the choice experiment part of the survey. We 
asked our data panel provider to provide us with 
1000 complete choice experiment respondents who 
were representative of the Irish population by age 
and gender. Survey participants were incrementally 
invited until 1000 respondents completed the choice 
experiment. Over this period, 280 respondents 
answered “no” to this first question and they completed 
the barriers question and provided socio-demographic 
data (Table 5.2). As can be seen in Table 5.2, there 
was a very high level of interest among citizens in 
investing in a renewable energy project, given its 
attractive investment profile.
Geographical location and proximity to renewables 
developments did not impact on “willingness to invest”, 
nor were there marked differences in terms of age and 
gender (although the “willing to invest” cohort included 
more males and was slightly older). However, those 
who were willing to invest and those who were not 
willing to invest differed in some respects. We found 
that household income was higher in the “willing to 
invest” cohort. This suggests that access to investment 
capital is a determinant of interest in investing in 
renewables. This finding is reinforced by responses 
to the barriers question. In this section, respondents 
were asked to rank the importance of key barriers 
that would prevent them from investing in renewable 
energy projects. For both cohorts, financial factors 
(“insufficient savings” and “access to loan finance”) 
were identified as key barriers. “Not enough savings” 
is particularly important for the “not willing to invest” 
Figure 5.1. Example of choice task.
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cohort, and “opposition to renewable energy in your 
community” is conversely less important, perhaps 
suggesting the primacy of economic and financial 
considerations. Another difference is that the “willing 
to invest” cohort were significantly more likely to have 
some investment experience (nearly half having some 
or a lot of investment experience). By comparison, the 
vast majority of the “not willing to invest” cohort had no 
investment experience.
While smaller investment amounts (under €500) were 
very popular, nearly half of respondents said that they 
would be willing to invest over €2000, while only 23% 
of the willing to invest cohort were willing to consider 
investment amounts of up to €10,000, or above, as 
shown in Figure 5.2.
To put this in context, according to SEAI, typical wind 
farms costs are in the region of €1.6–€2 million per 
MW. Hence, the cost of a 10 MW wind farm (which 
is small by Irish standards) is approximately €16 
million. Debt finance of 75% of total cost is generally 
available at financial close from a bank and the equity 
requirement is therefore in the region of €4 million. 
With 200 community investors, that amounts to 
€20,000 each. Pre-financial close development costs 
average 8.6% of the total, or €1.38 million (€6880 
each with 200 people), all of which is at risk before one 
knows if the project is viable.
These numbers suggest that, for smaller projects, 
full community ownership could be an option. For the 
vast majority of wind projects in Ireland (which are 
generally greater than 10 MW), financial participation 
from professional project developers is necessary.
5.4 Importance of Investment 
Attributes and Levels
We then measured the importance of the different 
characteristics of the investment options on citizen 
investors’ choices. Importance scores are calculated 
by examining how much difference each characteristic 
of the investment options contributes to the overall 
utility of an investment option. Importance scores are 
standardised to sum to 100% across all attributes. 
We found that financial characteristics such as return 
on investment, risk and the holding period are very 
important considerations for investors, compared with 
Table 5.2. Willingness to invest
Response Number Percentage Status
Yes 515 40 Full survey including choice experiment
Maybe 485 38 Full survey including choice experiment
No 280 22 Screened out after providing socio-demographic 
information and answering the question on barriers
Total 1280 100
Figure 5.2. Investment amount (percentage willing to invest cohort).
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the type of renewable technology, project partner and 
location of the investment.
This finding is also reflected in part-worth utilities. 
These reflect the relative desirability of an attribute 
level compared with other levels within the same 
attribute. The higher a utility, the more positively the 
specific attribute level influences decision-makers 
to opt for a certain investment. Again, the financial 
characteristics of an investment emerged as very 
important. High (8.75%) return on investment was very 
strongly favoured compared with low (1.25%) returns. 
“No risk” projects were very highly favoured compared 
with “moderate risk” projects and short (2-year) 
minimum holding periods were also strongly favoured 
compared with long (10-year) periods. To a lesser 
degree, citizen investors preferred solar to biomass 
(with wind in the middle) and they preferred projects 
closer to their home. They also had a slight preference 
for community-led projects in their area, compared 
with projects led by energy utilities and professional 
project developers.
5.5 Conclusions
It is clear from a preliminary analysis of our survey 
results that there is a willingness on behalf of many 
private citizens to consider investing in renewable 
energy projects. This is particularly the case among 
wealthier cohorts in society with some experience 
of making investment decisions. While over 30% of 
those willing to consider investing would invest no 
more than €500, nearly half would be willing to invest 
a substantial sum of over €2000. The key barriers for 
all cohorts are financial: not enough savings and no 
access to loan finance, but this is particularly the case 
for those who are not willing to invest.
The importance of financial considerations also 
emerges from the choice-based experiment, in which 
financial characteristics of investments (especially 
return on investment, but also risk and holding 
period) emerge as the key factors. While citizens 
tend to prefer solar projects led by community groups 
in their locality, these investment attributes have 
less importance for citizen investors compared with 
financial considerations.
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6 Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, we presented the findings from 
the work packages of the projects. These covered, in 
turn, a literature review, case studies, analysis of the 
use of financial incentives in Ireland and a survey of 
Irish citizens’ investment preferences. These chapters 
form the basis for evidence-based recommendations 
for the design of financial incentives in Ireland, with the 
objective of mobilising citizen investment. In the final 
chapter, we synthesise key overall policy conclusions 
and make recommendations for the design of financial 
incentives.
6.2 Conclusions on Designing 
Financial Incentives
Drawing definitive conclusions on the choice and 
design of incentives is made challenging by the 
absence of comprehensive evaluations of programmes 
and schemes that have been introduced. The 
literature review, case studies and our evaluation of 
Irish incentives programmes illustrate that ex post 
evaluations are not common. In some cases, no data 
on take-up of schemes are available. Even when 
evaluations have been undertaken they tend not to be 
systematic or consistent. In particular, distributional 
implications and institutional, administrative and 
governance factors tend not to be considered. Overall, 
there is a need to come to a greater understanding of 
the implications of using particular financial incentives. 
Potential downsides of using these incentives 
require careful monitoring so that social legitimacy is 
enhanced and not undermined.
Notwithstanding this caveat, it is clear that mobilising 
citizens as investors would have clear advantages: 
it would tap new sources of private capital, while 
also engendering greater levels of societal support 
for transition to a low-carbon economy. This would 
address two of the most prevalent barriers to such 
transition in Ireland and globally. Furthermore, it is 
clear that Irish citizens are interested in investing in 
low-carbon and resource-efficient assets. We conclude 
from the results of our survey of Irish citizens that 
financial participation could be achieved if investment 
options offering reasonable rates of return and low 
levels of risk were available. This is particularly the 
case among wealthier cohorts in society with some 
experience of making investment decisions. The 
key barriers for all cohorts are financial: not enough 
savings and no access to loan finance.
Within this context, setting a target for locally owned 
renewable energy sources would act to provide 
regulatory stability and underpin government intentions 
to promote energy citizenship, as outlined in the 
Energy White Paper (2014). Equivalent Scottish 
targets could be used as an example to guide policy 
development. In 2010, a target was set to deliver 
500 MW of community energy by 2020, which was 
delivered 5 years early. In the most recent Scottish 
Energy Strategy (2017), a new target has been set 
to achieve 1 gigawatt (GW) of community and locally 
owned energy by 2020 and 2 GW by 2030 (Scottish 
Government, 2015).
Carefully designed financial incentives emerge as 
a potentially important means of mobilising citizen 
investment. The benefits of using incentives, however, 
need to be balanced against the cost to the taxpayer 
of using these instruments. On the one hand, 
incentives necessarily require exchequer revenue, 
and governments would argue that controlling the 
cost of low-carbon transition is important for delivering 
continued societal buy-in and value for money to 
taxpayers. On the other hand, local citizens often 
provide their time on a voluntary basis (Rijpens et al., 
2013; IEA-RETD, 2016) and their involvement has 
been found to open up access to the optimal sites 
(for onshore wind or, for example, south-facing roof 
tops), thereby reducing cost (Nelson et al., 2016). 
Access to optimal locations for renewable projects is a 
particularly prevalent concern in Ireland, where many 
sites cannot be accessed because of local opposition. 
Should local opposition to onshore wind, biomass, 
waste-to-energy or solar plans prevent further project 
development, this would necessitate greater levels 
of offshore wind development if Irish decarbonisation 
objectives are to be met. This, in turn, would increase 
the overall cost of meeting climate objectives. While 
we would therefore conclude that there is a strong 
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economic case for mobilising citizen investment in 
Ireland, answering this question definitively was 
not the intended objective of this research project. 
Assessing the net costs and benefits of mobilising 
citizen investment is an area that merits further 
analytical attention.
One consideration that needs to be examined by 
Irish policymakers is how community-owned or partly 
community-owned projects could be financed in the 
new Integrated Single Electricity Market (ISEM). The 
new market arrangements are designed to lead to 
greater price integration with other European electricity 
markets and lower prices. However, the market is 
moving away from a fixed FiT and towards six daily 
auctions, which will result in significant variation in the 
prices that generators receive for power. This market 
restructuring will present potential market barriers to 
community and citizen groups, as significant market 
knowledge and the capacity to trade electricity 
generated into the market will be required.
Costs to the exchequer can be controlled through 
careful choice and design of financial incentives. 
Within this context, we proceed to drawing specific 
conclusions and recommendations for the choice and 
design of financial incentives.
1. Effectiveness of financial incentives: FiTs, FiPs, 
quota schemes, grants and tax incentives can be 
effective in mobilising greater levels of investment 
from local citizens, while soft loans tend to be less 
effective as a stand-alone instrument.
2. Instrument choice over design: While there 
is a debate in the literature concerning which 
financial incentives are optimal when it comes 
to mobilising local citizen investors, we conclude 
that it is not instrument choice per se that is 
the key consideration, but rather the design 
characteristics of the chosen instrument. In many 
cases, financial incentives are not designed with 
local citizen investors in mind, and while the 
intention may not be to exclude these actors, this 
can be the ultimate effect. This is because citizen 
investors, unlike professional project developers 
and developers, do not have the skills, expertise, 
experience or balance sheets to successfully take 
projects to fruition. It is necessary, therefore, to 
include specific design features into FiTs, FiPs, 
quotas, grants and tax incentives to counteract 
these disadvantages and to make sure that 
incentives are accessible to non-traditional 
investors classes.
3. FiTs compared with market-based schemes: 
The introduction of a FiT is a crucial turning point 
and critical success factor in mobilising local 
citizen investors in many jurisdictions. A key 
characteristic of FiTs is that they provide a stable 
long-term income stream, and they therefore 
reduce risk and make it easier to access bank 
funding, which appears particularly important 
for local citizen actors (abrupt changes to FiT 
schemes have undermined regulatory stability and 
market confidence, which is particularly important 
for citizen investors). We would emphasise, 
however, that introducing a FiT is not a sufficient 
condition for success. In many countries, not least 
Ireland, FiTs have not resulted in investment from 
non-professional project developers. What has 
emerged, therefore, is the importance of specific 
design features. FiTs differentiated according to 
project size and technology type open up niche 
opportunities for local citizens, and adders, 
contract set-asides and mandates have been used 
to modify FiTs and make them more attractive to 
citizen investors.
4. FiPs and quota-based schemes: While market-
based FiPs and quota-based schemes have 
sometimes been deemed inherently unattractive to 
citizen investors (because of the greater levels of 
uncertainty in terms of support they provide), we 
would again highlight the importance of instrument 
design. FiPs have been deployed successfully 
in Denmark (combined with a mandatory share 
offer for local citizens) and quota-based schemes 
have also been designed in a manner that  is 
advantageous to local community groups in 
Ontario and elsewhere. We conclude, therefore, 
that market-based supports can be designed 
with citizen investors in mind, and note that this 
could be a particularly important finding within 
the context of the migration to this category of 
incentive within the EU (Ragwitz et al., 2012) and 
Ireland.
5. Early-stage supports: Our case studies reveal 
the importance of introducing financial incentives 
at both the early and the later stages of projects 
to establish a business case for local citizen 
participation. In particular, these cases reveal the 
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crucial importance of introducing incentives to 
overcome risks at the feasibility and development 
stages of projects. Professional developers can 
generally offset these risks by developing a 
portfolio of projects, but this option is not available 
to local citizens. The requirement for early-stage 
incentives is a distinguishing feature of projects 
with citizen involvement, and it appears central to 
the value proposition of many business models. 
Non-recourse loans, soft loans and grants have 
all been introduced to address barriers to local 
citizens at feasibility and development stages. It 
should be noted that setting out clear planning and 
grid access guidelines, the provision of advice, 
expertise and other types of support may also be 
crucial in this respect.
6. Grants: While grants, in particular, may be 
effective (and indeed cost-effective for the 
exchequer in some cases) at overcoming early-
stage project costs and barriers, they also tend 
to be challenging and costly to administer and 
can favour wealthier cohorts in society. They are 
dependent on annual funding allocations from 
the exchequer, and changes in levels of support 
can lead to boom–bust investment cycles, which 
in turn can make the formation of a sustainable 
market challenging. In some cases, programmes 
can suffer from an element of path dependency. 
While grants no doubt therefore have an important 
role, their downsides need to be carefully 
considered and monitored.
7. Preference shares: Another option for dealing 
with early-stage project risk is for the project 
developer to grant preference shares to local 
citizen or community groups at the very early 
stages of project development. This would allow 
the local community to be part of the development 
without putting any capital at risk and, if the project 
does not proceed, the local citizen is not financially 
exposed. Once the project is operational, the 
preference shareholders will receive dividends 
(subject to covenants of senior lenders).
8. Migrating to market-based incentives: In all 
of the case studies, grants were initially used 
to promote citizen and community involvement. 
For example, in the UK, two grants programmes 
were introduced between 2000 (when promoting 
citizen investment first became a policy priority) 
and 2009. The objective was to promote pilot 
demonstration projects that serve a number of 
purposes. In these cases, grants may cover more 
than early-stage (feasibility and development) 
costs and may also cover or part-cover 
construction costs. They provide policy learning 
when they are monitored and assessed, promote 
awareness of opportunities across communities 
and provide best practice exemplars that can 
be replicated. These pilots paved the way for 
the introduction of a FiT with a community focus 
in 2009. Similarly, in Denmark and Germany, 
grants were initially used (in the 1970s and 
1980s) to promote exemplar projects with citizen 
involvement. In all cases, grants have given way 
to increasingly market-based supports over time.
9. Tax incentives: While citizen investors may 
be motivated by a wide range of factors, in the 
majority of cases it is necessary to offer a strong 
business case for investing. While a high-level 
financial incentive (such as a FiT or FiP) is 
important for the provision of long-term financial 
support over time, the favourable tax treatment of 
income from renewable energy projects emerges 
as an important supplementary consideration. 
Indeed, the removal of various UK tax incentives 
in 2015 undermined the business case for many 
renewable energy projects with community 
participation. Another benefit of tax incentives is 
that they do not necessarily require annual budget 
allocations from the exchequer and they can be 
extended for pre-agreed periods of time; they 
also tend to be considerably easier to administer 
and to access than grants (for which a complex 
application procedure is generally required). The 
downside of tax schemes is that predicting the 
impact ex ante can be challenging.
10. Ancillary considerations: We find that incentives 
should generally be introduced as part of policy 
packages, with ancillary measures addressing 
lack of familiarity with the technology, technology 
immaturity or low awareness of the incentive 
programme itself. Furthermore, understanding 
the characteristics of the target demographic, and 
indeed the characteristics of the LCT in question, 
is also crucial. If these factors are not considered 
in policy design, an incentive programme may 
not have the desired or predicted impact and 
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the cost-effectiveness and/or environmental 
effectiveness may suffer.
11. Concerted policy attention: Countries that 
do not have a tradition of mobilising citizen 
investors (such as Ireland) will have particular 
challenges in mobilising investments from these 
actors. It takes time to raise awareness of the 
opportunities among community groups. This 
requires a combination of new policy support in 
the form of financial incentives, combined with 
up-skilling of communities and dissemination 
of awareness of new opportunities. The case 
of Ontario, for example, illustrates that, even 
when a very attractive set of specifically tailored 
financial incentive are introduced (a grant covering 
early-stage project costs, combined with a FiT 
and community adder), citizen investment may 
not automatically result. It was only in the second 
stage of the FiT in 2011 (when a mandatory 
set-aside was introduced for community projects) 
that community projects began to get over the 
line. This highlights the importance of providing 
persistent policy focus and having an ability to 
assess the effectiveness of programmes in real 
time, identify problems as they arise and having 
the flexibility to trial and pilot new approaches on 
an ongoing basis. Based on the experiences of 
other countries, in particular the UK and Ontario, 
it is probable that mobilising significant levels of 
community investment will take persistent policy 
focus over at least the next decade.
6.3 Conclusions on Business Models
Typical business models have emerged in many 
countries as vehicles for local citizen participation, 
in both developer- and community-led projects, and 
these have been strongly influenced by the design 
and choice of financial incentives. Governments have 
used mandates (Denmark), voluntary obligations 
(UK) or adders and minimum reserve requirements 
in FiTs and award criteria in tenders (Ontario) to 
encourage professional project developers to involve 
local communities as equity investors in projects. 
Specific models have been influenced by favourable 
tax treatment of profits in Germany, Denmark and 
Ontario. This suggests that financial incentives can be 
designed to promote the emergence of typical models, 
which in turn can reduce transaction, legal and 
professional costs, and promote the more widespread 
deployment distribution of cost-effective renewable 
energy technologies controlled by local citizens.
We present a typology of models for citizen financial 
participation in Table 6.1 based on the findings from 
our work packages. These include fully community-
owned projects, projects led by a professional 
developer, and projects that do not involve investment/
ownership. From the financial characteristics of these 
models, it is clear that each comes with attendant 
advantages and disadvantages from a developer and 
a community/citizen perspective.
While we do not make specific recommendations in 
terms of choice of model, we note that for community-
owned projects, co-operatives tend to predominate 
in most countries. For developer-led models, while 
a number of options are common internationally, we 
note that shared revenue models offer a substantially 
de-risked opportunity for community investors and 
might therefore be particularly attractive within the 
context of our survey results, which indicate a high 
level of risk aversion on behalf of community investors. 
This model perhaps makes the least demands of 
community groups and allows them to substantially 
piggyback the skillset of professional developers, 
which could perhaps be an important consideration 
given the low levels of knowledge, awareness and 
financial expertise many communities have.
The joint venture model could also have applicability 
in Ireland. We note that a joint venture model 
could be combined with a Danish-type “option to 
purchase” scheme, which emerged as a popular 
model in research and a stakeholder consultation 
into community ownership previously undertaken 
(Tipperary Energy Agency, 2016). The basis of this 
option is that an obligation is placed on developers 
to offer investment shares to citizens within a pre-
determined radius of the project. The authors suggest 
that shares of low value (e.g. €250) could be offered 
to citizens and held in a trust until financial close. Our 
citizen survey (see Chapter 5) illustrates that many 
(over 30%) of those willing to invest in a renewables 
project would only consider amounts less than 
€500; popularising models that can facilitate small 
investment amounts could therefore be of importance. 
While the amounts might be small from a funding 
prospective, enabling citizen investors to invest could 
play an important role in building societal support for 
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LCTs and opening up investment opportunities to all 
socio-economic cohorts.
6.4 Proposal for Design of Irish 
Financial Incentives
Finally, we consider options for the introduction of 
financial incentives in Ireland. Our recommendations 
for the design of a specific financial incentive 
acknowledge, as a starting point, the lack of 
experience and understanding in Irish communities 
and among Irish citizens of the opportunities to 
develop collective projects in these areas. They 
also acknowledge the need to promote greater 
knowledge and awareness of the opportunities that 
exist (Chapters 1 and 5), particularly in collective 
wind, biomass, waste-to-energy and solar projects. In 
order to mobilise Irish citizen investment in renewable 
Table 6.1. Typology of models for citizen participation
Structure Form of 
return
Timing of return Risks Security Developer 
considerations
Community 
considerations
Models involving citizen investment/ownership
Fully 
community-
owned (e.g. 
co-operative)
Dividend if 
available
Annual dividend if 
available, but may 
be years before 
capital is repaid
Project risk
Potential cash 
calls
Ranks behind 
bank debt and 
preference 
equity
Taxation of income
Skills and expertise: 
is team bankable?
Joint venture Variable Variable, but 
usually senior 
debt would 
impose restrictive 
covenants on 
disbursement
Exposed to 
development 
risk pre-financial 
close 
Party to loan 
agreement
Usually have 
title over asset
Challenges of 
dealing with 
minority investor 
Avail of developer 
expertise
Drag and tag along 
and pre-emption 
provisions
Risk of cash call
Split ownership Variable Variable, but 
usually senior 
debt would 
impose restrictive 
covenants on 
disbursement 
Pools revenue 
from all turbines 
so reduces 
turbine-specific 
risk
Only have title 
to part of asset 
owned 
Title to 
substation for 
grid connection? 
Important for EIIS 
relief
If developer wants 
to sell or refinance 
could pose 
challenges
Avail of developer 
expertise
Risk of cost inflation
Does not qualify for 
tax relief 
Shared 
revenue
Community 
group 
provide 
percentage 
of project 
cost in 
return for 
share of 
profits 
Variable – annual 
disbursements
Capital returned at 
end of project
Senior debt 
imposes restrictive 
covenants on 
disbursement
Project risk, 
but eliminates 
development 
risk 
Community 
do not own a 
physical asset 
Challenges of 
dealing with 
minority investor
 
Avail of developer 
expertise 
Crowdfunding/
debt-based 
funding
Can be 
fixed 
coupon on 
debt
Variable – usually 
fixed and usually 
clear exit 
Project risk Usually ranks 
ahead of equity 
but after senior 
debt 
Retain control Small minimum 
investment – can 
be as low as €5
Liquid secondary 
market
Models not involving citizen investment/ownership
Lease 
agreement
Fixed circa 
2% of 
revenue
Annual None Ranks ahead 
of bank debt for 
repayment
Retains full 
ownership and 
control 
No ownership
Only landowners 
can benefit
Community 
benefit
€/MW pa 
guaranteed
Annual None Do not need 
any
Retains full 
ownership and 
control
No ownership
Fixed return
Specific benefits 
for near neighbours 
can be provided
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projects, we conclude that incentives will need to 
address specific barriers at different project stages 
(Table 6.2).
Our research indicates that, initially, there may be 
a need to promote the emergence of exemplar 
pilot community-led projects, and this will generally 
require grant funding. When the intention is to 
pilot new approaches, grants may cover feasibility 
and development costs but also a proportion of 
construction costs (see Chapter 3). Therefore, there 
may initially be a case for the introduction of a time-
bound grant programme. It should be emphasised that 
this applies only to projects that are community led. 
To ensure regulatory stability it is crucial that all grant-
based pilot projects are subject to close monitoring 
and evaluation so that these projects can inform future 
policy development.
The intention should be to migrate to a more market-
driven approach over time and away from grants for 
community-led projects. In the medium term, grants 
covering some or all of construction costs can be 
replaced with a project- and technology-differentiated 
FiT (with a maximum project threshold in the region 
of 5–10 MW), combined with non-recourse loans 
or grants covering early-stage (feasibility and 
development) costs, as in Scotland and England. As 
discussed in section 6.2, it is not the choice between 
these instruments that is most important, but rather 
the design components that ensure equal access to 
community groups and citizens, within the context of 
their skills, experiences and financial circumstances.
For developer-led projects, there may be a need 
for the market-based incentive programme (FiP or 
quota-based scheme) to be designed to favour equity 
participation from community groups. In the case of a 
FiP, this could come in the form of a mandate requiring 
a share offer to local citizens (as in Denmark), or in 
the case of a quota scheme, the award criteria could 
favour higher levels of equity participation from local 
communities and citizens (Ontario).
In the case of both developer- and community-led 
projects, the business case for citizen participation can 
be aided by favourable tax treatment of profits from 
these projects.
It should be noted that in this report we consider only 
the use of financial incentives. Comprehensive policy 
packages may include ancillary measures addressing 
lack of familiarity with the technology, technology 
immaturity, low awareness of the incentive programme 
itself or ensureing grid access. Local citizens will 
generally require access to technical expertise if 
they are successful in bringing the project to fruition. 
Informational, advisory and support services are 
best provided through an independent and trusted 
intermediary that has linkages with local communities, 
such as the Sustainable Development Authority of 
Ireland, local community development committees and 
credit unions, among other actors.
Finally, in this study we only considered options for 
mobilising community and local citizen investment. 
However, our survey results indicate that not all 
citizens have funds available or are interested 
in investing. It is likely, therefore, that enhanced 
community benefit schemes for neighbours or near-
neighbours may also be required in some cases. This 
could take the form of subsidised electricity bills or a 
straightforward payment per MW for local citizen and 
community groups. For example, the NTR Ora More 
Wind Farm Local Electricity Discount Scheme might 
be used as a template.
Table 6.2. Financial incentives to promote citizen investment in low-carbon projects
Incentive Community-led projects Developer-led projects
Phase 1 Time-bound grant programme covering early-stage and some 
construction costs 
FiP with mandate for community 
participation or quota-based scheme with 
favourable award criteria for projects with 
community equity participation
Phase 2 Differentiated FiT with grants or non-recourse loans for early-stage 
project costs
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BER Building energy rating
BYO Build your own
CO2 Carbon dioxide
EFI Economic and financial incentive
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FiP Feed-in premium
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AN GHNÍOMHAIREACHT UM CHAOMHNÚ COMHSHAOIL
Tá an Ghníomhaireacht um Chaomhnú Comhshaoil (GCC) freagrach as an 
gcomhshaol a chaomhnú agus a fheabhsú mar shócmhainn luachmhar do 
mhuintir na hÉireann. Táimid tiomanta do dhaoine agus don chomhshaol a 
chosaint ó éifeachtaí díobhálacha na radaíochta agus an truaillithe.
Is féidir obair na Gníomhaireachta a  
roinnt ina trí phríomhréimse:
Rialú: Déanaimid córais éifeachtacha rialaithe agus comhlíonta 
comhshaoil a chur i bhfeidhm chun torthaí maithe comhshaoil a 
sholáthar agus chun díriú orthu siúd nach gcloíonn leis na córais sin.
Eolas: Soláthraímid sonraí, faisnéis agus measúnú comhshaoil atá 
ar ardchaighdeán, spriocdhírithe agus tráthúil chun bonn eolais a 
chur faoin gcinnteoireacht ar gach leibhéal.
Tacaíocht: Bímid ag saothrú i gcomhar le grúpaí eile chun tacú 
le comhshaol atá glan, táirgiúil agus cosanta go maith, agus le 
hiompar a chuirfidh le comhshaol inbhuanaithe.
Ár bhFreagrachtaí
Ceadúnú
Déanaimid na gníomhaíochtaí seo a leanas a rialú ionas nach 
ndéanann siad dochar do shláinte an phobail ná don chomhshaol:
•  saoráidí dramhaíola (m.sh. láithreáin líonta talún, loisceoirí, 
stáisiúin aistrithe dramhaíola);
•  gníomhaíochtaí tionsclaíocha ar scála mór (m.sh. déantúsaíocht 
cógaisíochta, déantúsaíocht stroighne, stáisiúin chumhachta);
•  an diantalmhaíocht (m.sh. muca, éanlaith);
•  úsáid shrianta agus scaoileadh rialaithe Orgánach 
Géinmhodhnaithe (OGM);
•  foinsí radaíochta ianúcháin (m.sh. trealamh x-gha agus 
radaiteiripe, foinsí tionsclaíocha);
•  áiseanna móra stórála peitril;
•  scardadh dramhuisce;
•  gníomhaíochtaí dumpála ar farraige.
Forfheidhmiú Náisiúnta i leith Cúrsaí Comhshaoil
•  Clár náisiúnta iniúchtaí agus cigireachtaí a dhéanamh gach 
bliain ar shaoráidí a bhfuil ceadúnas ón nGníomhaireacht acu.
•  Maoirseacht a dhéanamh ar fhreagrachtaí cosanta comhshaoil na 
n-údarás áitiúil.
•  Caighdeán an uisce óil, arna sholáthar ag soláthraithe uisce 
phoiblí, a mhaoirsiú.
• Obair le húdaráis áitiúla agus le gníomhaireachtaí eile chun dul 
i ngleic le coireanna comhshaoil trí chomhordú a dhéanamh ar 
líonra forfheidhmiúcháin náisiúnta, trí dhíriú ar chiontóirí, agus 
trí mhaoirsiú a dhéanamh ar leasúchán.
•  Cur i bhfeidhm rialachán ar nós na Rialachán um 
Dhramhthrealamh Leictreach agus Leictreonach (DTLL), um 
Shrian ar Shubstaintí Guaiseacha agus na Rialachán um rialú ar 
shubstaintí a ídíonn an ciseal ózóin.
•  An dlí a chur orthu siúd a bhriseann dlí an chomhshaoil agus a 
dhéanann dochar don chomhshaol.
Bainistíocht Uisce
•  Monatóireacht agus tuairisciú a dhéanamh ar cháilíocht 
aibhneacha, lochanna, uiscí idirchriosacha agus cósta na 
hÉireann, agus screamhuiscí; leibhéil uisce agus sruthanna 
aibhneacha a thomhas.
•  Comhordú náisiúnta agus maoirsiú a dhéanamh ar an gCreat-
Treoir Uisce.
•  Monatóireacht agus tuairisciú a dhéanamh ar Cháilíocht an 
Uisce Snámha.
Monatóireacht, Anailís agus Tuairisciú ar  
an gComhshaol
•  Monatóireacht a dhéanamh ar cháilíocht an aeir agus Treoir an AE 
maidir le hAer Glan don Eoraip (CAFÉ) a chur chun feidhme.
•  Tuairisciú neamhspleách le cabhrú le cinnteoireacht an rialtais 
náisiúnta agus na n-údarás áitiúil (m.sh. tuairisciú tréimhsiúil ar 
staid Chomhshaol na hÉireann agus Tuarascálacha ar Tháscairí).
Rialú Astaíochtaí na nGás Ceaptha Teasa in Éirinn
•  Fardail agus réamh-mheastacháin na hÉireann maidir le gáis 
cheaptha teasa a ullmhú.
•  An Treoir maidir le Trádáil Astaíochtaí a chur chun feidhme i gcomhair 
breis agus 100 de na táirgeoirí dé-ocsaíde carbóin is mó in Éirinn.
Taighde agus Forbairt Comhshaoil
•  Taighde comhshaoil a chistiú chun brúnna a shainaithint, bonn 
eolais a chur faoi bheartais, agus réitigh a sholáthar i réimsí na 
haeráide, an uisce agus na hinbhuanaitheachta.
Measúnacht Straitéiseach Timpeallachta
•  Measúnacht a dhéanamh ar thionchar pleananna agus clár beartaithe 
ar an gcomhshaol in Éirinn (m.sh. mórphleananna forbartha).
Cosaint Raideolaíoch
•  Monatóireacht a dhéanamh ar leibhéil radaíochta, measúnacht a 
dhéanamh ar nochtadh mhuintir na hÉireann don radaíocht ianúcháin.
•  Cabhrú le pleananna náisiúnta a fhorbairt le haghaidh éigeandálaí 
ag eascairt as taismí núicléacha.
•  Monatóireacht a dhéanamh ar fhorbairtí thar lear a bhaineann le 
saoráidí núicléacha agus leis an tsábháilteacht raideolaíochta.
•  Sainseirbhísí cosanta ar an radaíocht a sholáthar, nó maoirsiú a 
dhéanamh ar sholáthar na seirbhísí sin.
Treoir, Faisnéis Inrochtana agus Oideachas
•  Comhairle agus treoir a chur ar fáil d’earnáil na tionsclaíochta 
agus don phobal maidir le hábhair a bhaineann le caomhnú an 
chomhshaoil agus leis an gcosaint raideolaíoch.
•  Faisnéis thráthúil ar an gcomhshaol ar a bhfuil fáil éasca a 
chur ar fáil chun rannpháirtíocht an phobail a spreagadh sa 
chinnteoireacht i ndáil leis an gcomhshaol (m.sh. Timpeall an Tí, 
léarscáileanna radóin).
•  Comhairle a chur ar fáil don Rialtas maidir le hábhair a 
bhaineann leis an tsábháilteacht raideolaíoch agus le cúrsaí 
práinnfhreagartha.
•  Plean Náisiúnta Bainistíochta Dramhaíola Guaisí a fhorbairt chun 
dramhaíl ghuaiseach a chosc agus a bhainistiú.
Múscailt Feasachta agus Athrú Iompraíochta
•  Feasacht chomhshaoil níos fearr a ghiniúint agus dul i bhfeidhm 
ar athrú iompraíochta dearfach trí thacú le gnóthais, le pobail 
agus le teaghlaigh a bheith níos éifeachtúla ar acmhainní.
•  Tástáil le haghaidh radóin a chur chun cinn i dtithe agus in ionaid 
oibre, agus gníomhartha leasúcháin a spreagadh nuair is gá.
Bainistíocht agus struchtúr na Gníomhaireachta um 
Chaomhnú Comhshaoil
Tá an ghníomhaíocht á bainistiú ag Bord lánaimseartha, ar a bhfuil 
Ard-Stiúrthóir agus cúigear Stiúrthóirí. Déantar an obair ar fud cúig 
cinn d’Oifigí:
• An Oifig um Inmharthanacht Comhshaoil
• An Oifig Forfheidhmithe i leith cúrsaí Comhshaoil
• An Oifig um Fianaise is Measúnú
• Oifig um Chosaint Radaíochta agus Monatóireachta Comhshaoil
• An Oifig Cumarsáide agus Seirbhísí Corparáideacha
Tá Coiste Comhairleach ag an nGníomhaireacht le cabhrú léi. Tá 
dáréag comhaltaí air agus tagann siad le chéile go rialta le plé a 
dhéanamh ar ábhair imní agus le comhairle a chur ar an mBord.
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Ireland has considerable challenges in transitioning to a low-carbon resource-efficient economy. 
EU emissions and renewables targets are not on track to being met, leaving the exchequer exposed 
to several hundred million in possible fines. If Ireland is to meet its ambitious climate change and 
renewable energy objectives, rapid decarbonisation is required over the coming decades. This 
report presents findings from a literature review, national and international case studies, and a 
survey of Irish citizens.
Identifying pressures
In Ireland, in contrast to countries such as Denmark and 
Germany, there are few examples of citizen and community 
renewable projects. Opposition to renewable technologies 
in rural communities has emerged as a key barrier to 
meeting decarbonisation objectives, leading to a key policy 
focus on promoting “energy citizenship”. 
A survey conducted for this research suggests that 78% of 
a representative sample of Irish citizens were interested 
in investing in distributed renewable energy technologies. 
However, investment amounts were found to be low 
relative to project costs, and the majority of citizens were 
found to be highly risk-averse. Wealthier cohorts with some 
experience of making investment decisions were more likely 
to consider investing, and key barriers to financial citizen 
participation included insufficient savings and no access to 
loan finance.
Informing policy
The research finds that financial incentives designed with 
citizen investors in mind, including feed in tariffs, feed in 
premiums, quota schemes, grants and taxes, have been 
successfully deployed within a variety of contexts. Soft 
loans, however, have been less effective as a stand-alone 
instrument . The International case studies illustrate that 
citizens can be mobilised as investors, both in countries 
with a long history of citizen investment (Germany and 
Denmark), but also in jurisdictions where this tradition is 
not evident (the UK and the Canadian state of Ontario). 
Financial supports introduced at the early stage of project 
development, when risk is highest, emerge as a key success 
factor. Agency support for citizen groups, along with clear 
and consistent planning policies that are streamlined with 
incentive application and grid access procedures, were also 
found to be of high importance. 
Developing solutions
The findings suggest that larger projects will generally 
require a professional developer acting in concert with 
local actors, and in these cases a market-based incentive 
programme, such as a quota scheme, can be designed 
to favour equity participation from  local citizens and 
community groups. A mandate requiring a share offer to 
local citizens (as in Denmark) could also be considered. 
Setting a target for community ownership, following 
the Scottish approach, would underpin Government 
commitment to local ownership outlined in the Energy 
White Paper (2015). Furthermore, community groups will 
need significant agency support if they are to acquire the 
necessary technical, financial, legal and other skills.
Many industrialised countries are incentivising the up-take 
of distributed renewable energy technologies such as 
wind, solar and biomass, which can make a very substantial 
contribution to global decarbonisation. These technologies 
can be particularly attractive for local citizen investors 
because they are decentralised, small in scale, modular and 
reliable. Mobilising citizen investment has the potential 
to unlock a new source of capital, but also to promote 
greater levels of understanding and acceptance of these 
technologies in local communities.
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